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JUSTICE SCALIA'S DEATH PENALTY
STEVEN

G. GEY*

T

HE death penalty has plagued the United States Supreme Court
ever since 1976, when the Court ended a four-year hiatus on the
imposition of death as a criminal punishment. The Court struck down
all existing death penalty statutes in 1972 on the ground that they were
unconstitutionally arbitrary.' In Justice Stewart's colorful phrase, the
Court found that the death penalty as applied in 1972 was "cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual." 2 Individuals executed under that system constituted "a capriciously selected random handful," 3 whose cases could not be distinguished logically from the far larger number of murder cases in which
the death penalty had not been imposed.
The Court approved a new generation of death p nalty statutes in
1976. 4 These statutes included provisions specifying~the aggravating
circumstances that justified the application of the death penalty. The
Court held that by guiding the discretion of the sentencer at capital
trials in this way, these new statutes cured the arbitrariness that had
characterized the statutes struck down in Furman v. Georgia.' Since
1976, the Court has been inundated with appeals from capital defendants asserting that the new capital punishment system contains myriad constitutional flaws. To fulfill its 1976 promise to eradicate the
arbitrary nature of the death penalty's earlier incarnation, the Court
has been forced to immerse itself in the details of the new system it
helped create.
Despite the deluge of litigation since the 1976 decisions, certain aspects of death penalty law remain unresolved. Arguably the most important issue that remains unresolved is also the most basic: What is
the constitutionally approved purpose of the death penalty? The
Court has avoided answering this question, choosing instead to defer
to state judgments about justification, while addressing the constitu*Associate
Professor of Law, Florida State University. B.A., :978, Eckerd College;
J.D., 1982, Columbia University.
i. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 309-10. (Stewart, J., concurring).
4. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas. 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

5. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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tional problems surrounding the death penalty in purely procedural
terms. The Court has treated the "arbitrariness" factor as a mechanical matter having to do only with the exactitude of the fit between the
statutorily defined aggravating factors and the particular facts of
cases prosecuted under the system. Thus, the Court has spent copious
amounts of time and energy fine-tuning the process. At the same time,
the Court has avoided addressing the more fundamental aspect of arbitrariness: The states imposing the death penalty have never been
able to articulate a rational justification for the death penalty.
The Court's many attempts to fine-tune the mechanics of the capital punishment process are incoherent because there is no constitutionally approved guiding objective for the death penalty. The Court has
never specified what the capital punishment process is intended to
achieve. Thus, no matter how precisely the Court defines the characteristics that identify who may be put to death, the deaths themselves
have no legitimate purpose and are therefore unconstitutionally arbitrary.
Three recent cases regarding the use of victim impact statements
during the penalty phase of capital trials illustrate the Court's continuing dilemma concerning the death penalty. 6 These cases are unusual
in that several justices use the victim impact statement issue as an opportunity to discuss their views on the purposes of capital punishment. This Article examines the views expressed in these cases,
focusing especially on those of Justice Scalia. In Booth v. Maryland,
the first victim-impact case, Justice Powell wrote that such statements
should not be introduced at the penalty phase of capital trials because
they are irrelevant to the defendant's moral blameworthiness. 7 Justice
Scalia, on the other hand, argued that the death penalty is not intended solely to punish moral blameworthiness. Rather, he argued
that another major objective of the death penalty is to sanction actions relating to the defendant's "personal responsibility." 8 In other
words, in Scalia's view, death penalty statutes are intended to inflict
punishment commensurate with the degree of harm which may be
considered independent of the defendant's moral blameworthiness.
I will argue in this Article that there are two major problems with
Scalia's proposal. First, justifying the death penalty as punishment for
personal responsibility, as Scalia recommends, in effect permits the
state to punish a defendant more severely because he or she killed a

6.

See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S.

805 (1989); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).

7. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505.
8. Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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well-known or well-regarded victim. Leaving aside the inegalitarian
(and possibly racial) overtones of this recommendation, Justice Scalia's suggested objective cannot be supported by an analysis of the factors in most death penalty statutes. I will argue that the factors in
these statutes indicate a much more elemental rationale for the death
penalty than the desire to punish either moral blameworthiness or personal responsibility. In short, a single theme seems to motivate death
penalty statutes: fear of the incorrigible murderer. I will argue that
this motivation is an improper basis for punishment, insofar as it is
based on unprovable conjecture about the defendant's future conduct,
and because it apportions punishment based on society's own insecure
group psychology rather than on the nature and degree of the defendant's guilt.
Second, I will argue that Justice Scalia's focus on popular outrage
as a justification for the introduction of victim impact statements in
capital trials suggests an even more unsavory rationale for the death
penalty: undifferentiated vengeance. Justice Scalia implies that the potential for injustice regarding a particular capital defendant is outweighed by society's need to use capital trials to purge its collective
anger and moral outrage at violent crime. By permitting victim impact
evidence to be used in capital sentencing, Justice Scalia suggests that
the Constitution permits individual justice to be sacrificed for the
needs of society at large. Under Justice Scalia's system, capital murder trials may be used to vent society's collective outrage, and individual capital defendants may be used as agents of this psychic
purgation. This use of capital punishment as a collective moral palliative moves beyond traditional arguments based on moral retribution
into the realm of amoral vengeance. I will argue in the concluding
section that this move represents the final defeat of the Court's stated
goal of removing arbitrariness from individual capital trials.

I.

THE

TWISTED PATH OF THE VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES

The United States Supreme Court has issued three opinions over a
period of only five years addressing the use of victim impact statements at the penalty phase of death penalty trials.' On its face, this
narrow and technical evidentiary issue hardly seems worth so much of
the Court's time and energy. Yet this issue also has produced some of
the Court's more caustic recent dissents, several unusual procedural
snafus by the Court's conservative majority, and an unseemly scram-

9.

See cases cited supra note 6.
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ble to ensure that the Court's early decisions in favor of defendants
were reversed during the very first term after Justice Souter's appointment shifted the Court's majority on this issue in favor of the state.' 0
Apart from providing entertaining judicial theater, these cases also
illustrate the central problem that has characterized death penalty jurisprudence since the Court once again permitted executions in 1976.
Like most death penalty issues that come before the Court, the Court
treated the victim impact statement issue as a practical question of
procedural justice. Both opponents and proponents of victim impact
evidence couched the issue in terms of how such evidence factors into
the elaborate system of guided discretion that distinguishes modern
capital sentencing schemes. Although the debate over victim impact
evidence thus was cast in traditional evidentiary terms of relevance,
this "relevance" debate was carried on within the Byzantine constitutional framework of capital punishment law, in which certain types of
evidence are relevant for mitigating a sentence but not for aggravating
a sentence. The conservatives on the Court used the victim impact
statement issue to attack the constitutional framework itself, arguing
that the discretionary premises now built into the system should be
modified to offer more sentencing discretion in favor of the prosecutor and less in favor of the defense.
A.

The Cases

The Court has issued a new victim impact statement opinion every
other year since 1987. In the first two cases, Booth v. Maryland" in
1987 and South Carolina v. Gathers2 in 1989, the Court voted 5-4 to
preclude victim impact statements at the penalty phase of a death penalty trial. In the third case, Payne v. Tennessee, 3 a Court free of
Justice Brennan's vote and influence voted 6-3 to overrule both earlier
cases, thus permitting the introduction of these statements. 14

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra note 14.
482 U.S. 496 (1987).
490 U.S. 805 (1989).
111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
The Booth majority actually lost its crucial fifth vote when Justice Powell retired in

1988. In theory, Gathers should have been the case that overruled the Booth rule, but Justice
O'Connor chose to write a narrow dissent in Gathers. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805,

812 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She asserted that although she remained ready to overrule
Booth, Booth did not apply to the statements the prosecutor made in Gathers. Id. at 813-14
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor's attempt to distinguish between prosecutorial statements

about the murder victim and statements about the murder victim's family split hairs too finely
for Justice White, who dissented in Booth. White noted curtly that "[ulnless Booth is to be
overruled, the judgment below must be affirmed," Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted), thus providing Justice Brennan with the fifth vote to keep Booth alive
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Relevant factual differences in the cases are minor. In Booth the
Court prohibited the application in death penalty cases of a Maryland

for another few years.
After Justice Brennan's retirement in July 1990, the Court's conservatives once again took aim
at Booth. However, the conservatives' haste to overrule Booth and Gathers at times made them
resemble the gang that couldn't shoot straight. The Court granted certiorari on a case containing
Booth issues on the first day of its 1990-91 term, Ohio v. Huertas, Ill S. Ct. 39 (1990), which
was the Court's first day of business following Justice Brennan's resignation. Unfortunately, the
Ohio Supreme Court's decision overturning the death sentence in Huertas relied explicitly on
state evidentiary law, not on the federal constitutional rule articulated in Booth. See State v.
Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990). According to the adequate and independent state
grounds doctrine, any ruling from the United States Supreme Court would be an advisory opinion and therefore a violation of the Court's authority under Article III. Huertas' counsel pointed
this out to the Court in her initial papers opposing certiorari, and reminded the Court again in a
motion to dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted. Even the State of Ohio was sheepish
about the relevance of Booth and Gathers to the Huertas case. The State did not even argue in
its brief to the Supreme Court that Booth and Gathers applied; this contention was merely included in its request for relief. See Brief for Appellant, Ohio v. Huertas, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991)
(No. 89-1944).
The Court denied Huertas' motion to dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted, Ill S. Ct.
383 (1990), and held oral argument on January 16, 1991. To no one's great surprise, the oral
argument in Huertas revolved largely around the state-law basis of the Ohio Supreme Court's
ruling. Six days after oral argument, the Court issued a one-sentence order dismissing certiorari
as improvidently granted. Ohio v. Huertas, I ll S. Ct. 805 (1991).
Although the 1990-91 Term was nearly half over, the Court's conservative majority was not
ready to let Booth and Gathers survive another year. On February 15, 1991, the Court granted
certiorari on another Booth/Gathers case. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 1031 (1991). The
Court's new majority eventually used Payne as a vehicle for overruling the two prior cases. Once
again, the Court's unseemly haste to overrule Booth and Gathers raised questions about its judgment and its technical competence. First, the Tennessee Supreme Court had ruled that even if
there was a Booth error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Payne,
791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990). Thus, the constitutionality of Booth was not even an issue in
the case. Both parties recognized this. Neither party in the case had asked the Court to reconsider the constitutionality of Booth. So the Supreme Court's order included not just the standard
sentence granting certiorari, but also a directive to the parties instructing them to brief an issue
that they had not even raised. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 1031 (1991). There are indications that the Court was almost beside itself in its haste to bury Booth and Gathers. Monday,
February 15, 1991, was a federal holiday. The Court usually issues orders on the Tuesday following a federal holiday that falls on a Monday, but the order granting certiorari in Payne was
issued on the holiday itself. See Stephen Wermiel, Supreme Court's Conservative Majority
Again Stumbles on Victim-Rights Issue, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1991, at 7B. In addition, the
Court had to confront another obstacle in the form of its own rules. February 15 was so late in
the Supreme Court's term that the parties could not observe the regular briefing schedule and
still argue the case in time for the Court to issue an opinion before its summer recess. The Court
dispensed with this minor obstacle by expediting the briefing schedule and setting oral argument
for the following April. Id.
The Court's comedy of errors did not stop there. In its rush to decide an issue the parties
hadn't asked the Court to address, the Supreme Court neglected to note that the parties had
asked the Court to decide two other issues. See Petition for Certiorari, Payne v. Tennessee, Ill
S. Ct. 1031 (1991) (No. 90-5721). So after issuing its extraordinary order on a holiday (presumably to permit the parties to start as soon as possible on their briefs, which were now subject to a
highly abbreviated briefing schedule), the Court had to issue an amended certiorari order on
February 19 to make it clear that the justices were only interested in the Booth/Gathersissue and
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statute requiring the introduction of a victim impact statement. The
statute allowed the prosecutor either to read the statement to the jury
or to call the victim's family members to testify about such things as
the economic loss suffered because of the victim's death, the change
in the family's personal welfare and relationships, and the family
members' psychological injury." In response to a motion by Booth's
attorney, the prosecutor at Booth's trial simply read the statements to
the jury rather than put the family members on the stand.' 6 In Gathers
the prosecutor made statements to the jury about the victim's personal
characteristics, but did not introduce statements made by the victim's
family. 7 Payne involved both family and prosecutorial statements
about the victims, and included personal testimony by the mother and
grandmother of two victims.'"
The victim impact statements introduced at the three trials differed
in scope and length, but the nature of the evidence in each case was
similar. The statements in Booth illustrate the potential breadth of
victim impact statements. As the Booth statement indicates, there are
three types of victim impact evidence: testimony relating the positive
characteristics of the victim or victims, testimony concerning the psychological and behavioral effects on survivors resulting from the victims' deaths, and testimony relating survivors' opinions about the
defendant.19
There was extensive testimony of all three types in Booth, which
involved a robbery-murder of a husband and wife, both of whom
were in their 70s. The victim impact statement included comments
from the victims' son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter describing the victims' outstanding personal qualities, their long, happy
marriage, and their active life in retirement. 20 The statement contained
descriptions of the victims' funeral as "the largest in the history of the
Levinson Funeral Home.' '21 Several surviving family members described the psychological impact of the crime on the remaining members of the family, including depression and lack of sleep.2 2 One
family member stated that she could not even "look at kitchen knives
had not intended to grant certiorari on any of the other issues. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
1407 (1991). After all this, there was (to put it mildly) little doubt about how the Court would
finally rule in Payne.
15. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c)(3) (1986).
16. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1987).
17. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 807 (1989).
18. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2603 (1991).
19. Booth, 482 U.S. at 510-15.
20. Id. at 499 n.3.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 499-500.
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without being reminded of the murder." 23 Finally, the statement included an assertion by the victims' daughter that she could not forgive
the murderer and that "such a person could 'In]ever be rehabilitated."' 2 4 The victim impact statements introduced in Gathers and
Payne were less extensive than the statement in Booth, but they included similar evidence.2"
B.

Victim Impact Statements and the DiscretionarySentencing Issue

The debate within the Court in the victim impact statement cases
largely revolves around whether any evidence typically contained in a
victim impact statement is relevant to the application of the death
penalty. The justices voting in favor of the defendants in these cases
describe the issue as whether this evidence relates to "the character of
the individual and the circumstances of the crime." 2
The requirement that evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case
relate either to the defendant's character or to the circumstances of
the crime is derived from language in the Court's 1976 decisions permitting states to impose the death penalty. Two of the five cases in
1976 overturned state statutes imposing death as a mandatory sentence for the commission of particular categories of capital murder.27
The plurality's rationale for overturning these mandatory death statutes was that the statutes did not provide the "particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each
convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of
death.'"' In later years, in cases including Lockett v. Ohio 29 and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 0 the Court transformed this rationale for prohibiting mandatory death sentences into a generalized requirement that
the sentencer in a capital case be given unlimited discretion to avoid a
death sentence based on factors related to any aspect of the defendant's character or crime.
23. Id. at 500.
24. Id. (citation omitted).
25. In Gathers the prosecutor made extensive remarks about the character of the victim,
including the statement that he was a "religious person." South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S.
805, 808 (1989). The prosecutor then read a prayer written on a card found in the victim's personal effects. Id. at 808-09. In Payne the prosecutor and one victim's mother testified about the
effects on the victim's son. Payne v. Tennessee, Il1 S. Ct. 2597, 2603 (1991).
26. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
879 (1983)).
27. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
28. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
29. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
30. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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The justices who voted to exclude victim impact statements in
Booth, Gathers, and Payne argued that such evidence is irrelevant under this standard. The three types of victim impact evidence-testimony about the character of the victim, the effects on survivors
resulting from the victim's death, and the survivors' opinions about
the defendant-do not relate to the defendant's character or to the
circumstances of the crime. Moreover, all three types of evidence
share an important characteristic: they involve information that the
defendant did not know before or during the crime, which therefore
could not have affected the defendant's actions during the crime.
It is essential to understand that the holdings of Booth, Gathers,
and Payne do not pertain to all victim impact evidence. The rules established in those cases apply only to victim impact evidence about
which the defendant was ignorant at the time of the crime. If the victim impact information was known to the defendant at the time of the
crime, such evidence would almost always be relevant to the defendant's criminal actions or motives and therefore would be introduced
during the guilt phase of the trial. For example, if the impact on the
victim occurred during the commission of the crime, evidence of the
impact would be presented as part of the description of the crime at
the guilt phase of the trial. Conversely, if the victim impact evidence is
being introduced only at the penalty phase of the trial as part of a
victim impact statement, then the evidence almost by definition does
not relate in any way to the circumstances of or motivation for the
murder because prosecutors logically would introduce during the guilt
phase of the trial all salient evidence regarding the elements of the
crime.3"

31. Justice Souter's Payne concurrence indicates that he misunderstood the distinction between "victim impact evidence" broadly defined as evidence incidental to describing the actual
circumstances of the crime and "victim impact evidence" narrowly defined as evidence relating
only to the subsequent effect of the crime on those not present during the commission of the
crime and which has no bearing on the facts surrounding the crime. Payne v. Tennessee, I II S.
Ct. 2597, 2616-17 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). Souter argued that because the rules of evidence permit prosecutors to introduce at the guilt phase of a capital trial "victim impact evidence" broadly defined (for example, in situations where a witness to the crime may also be
personally affected by the crime), the Constitution should also permit prosecutors to introduce
"victim impact evidence" narrowly defined at the penalty phase. Id. at 2618-19 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
Justice Stevens pointed out one fallacy of Souter's assumption. Stevens noted that under traditional evidentiary rules, material that is irrelevant for one purpose may be introduced if it is
relevant for another purpose. Id. at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing JOHN H. WIGMORE,
EVtDENCE § 13 (P. Tillers rev. 1983)). Moreover, Justice Souter exaggerated the extent to which
even broadly defined victim impact evidence will be relevant at the guilt phase of a capital trial.
He offered this example: A minister is murdered, and the minister's wife and child witness the
murder. The defendant does not know that the victim is a minister or that the victim's family has
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Except in exceptional circumstances,3 2 victim impact statements also
do not relate to the specific aggravating factors in death penalty statutes, which are intended to guide the sentencer's discretion during the
penalty phase of a capital trial. Those factors, which are discussed in
Section IV," all relate to the defendant's character and background
and to the circumstances of the crime. They do not relate to the sorts
34
of evidence typically contained in victim impact statements.

seen the crime. Souter notes, correctly, that both the wife and the child will be permitted to
testify about the circumstances of the crime and that to put that testimony into context the jury
may be informed "that the victim was a minister, with a wife and child, on an errand to his
church." Payne, III S. Ct. at 2617 (Souter, J., concurring). The fact that this testimony contains some basic information about the victims leads Justice Souter to the extravagant conclusion
that "Booth's objective will not be attained without requiring a separate sentencing jury to be
empaneled." Id.
Justice Souter is mistaken because the type of evidence that would be introduced during the
guilt phase of his hypothetical trial (assuming that both the judge and the defense lawyer are on
their toes) would not be "victim impact evidence" as defined in Booth. Booth specifically permits testimony about the circumstances of the crime, including testimony from family members
who witnessed the crime. What Booth would not permit is testimony of the sort introduced in
Booth itself-that the family members had to undergo therapy in the months following the
crime, that one victim was a man of God and a good husband, and that his wife believed the
defendant should be put to death. Testimony of this sort would never be introduced at the guilt
phase of Justice Souter's hypothetical trial because it would not relate in any way to the elements
of the crime with which the defendant is charged. Thus, contrary to Justice Souter's assertion,
Booth could be respected without either "seriously reduc[ing] the comprehensibility of most
trials," or requiring a "separate sentencing jury to be empaneled." Id.
32. See infra note 34.
33. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
34. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which victim impact evidence would relate to one
of these factors. Justice Souter describes a situation in which a minister is killed in front of his
wife and daughter. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2616-17 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
As Justice Souter says, the wife and daughter would be permitted to testify about what they saw
at the guilt phase of the trial. Also, Justice Souter correctly notes that the jury will be told the
identity of the witnesses to give the fact-finder "enough information about surrounding circumstances to let them make sense of the narrowly material facts." Id. at 2617 (Souter, J., concurring). Thus, "[t]he jury will not be kept from knowing that the victim was a minister, with a wife
and child, on an errand to his church." Id. Finally, I agree with Souter's observation that "if
these facts are not kept from the jury at the guilt stage, they will be in the jurors' minds at the
sentencing stage." Id. Although this rendition of this testimony's likely consequences is probably
accurate, it does not justify Justice Souter's conclusion that the Booth rule should be overturned
and victim impact statements of every sort should be permitted in every trial. Id. at 2617-19
(Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter's conclusion misses the point of the modern penalty
phase structure. The facts in his hypothetical may be "in the jurors' minds at the sentencing
stage," but the jury would be hard-pressed to use Justice Souter's facts to support any of the
aggravating factors found in the typical death penalty statute. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text. Thus, if no other evidence was introduced at the penalty phase in Justice Souter's
hypothetical, the judge would have to rule as a matter of law that the death penalty was unjustified because no statutory aggravating factor had been proven. It would be different if the wife
and daughter witnessed the murderer torturing the minister before killing him. In that case the
witness's testimony would be directly relevant to the "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" aggravat-
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If victim impact statements are irrelevant to any element of the capital murder crime and to any legitimate aggravating factor enumerated
in death penalty statutes, they can have only one purpose: to inflame
and prejudice the jury. Indeed, as Justice Powell noted in Booth, not

only is victim impact evidence irrelevant to the defendant's character
and crime, it is actually intended to "divert [the jury] from deciding

the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the
defendant" 35 by focusing the jury on the suffering of the victim's survivors. This, in turn, introduces factors that may lead to arbitrary and
even invidious sentencing decisions. Focusing attention on the victims
invites the jury to make distinctions between different categories of
victims, "identify[ing] some victims as more worthy of protection

than others." 3 6 In particular, victim impact evidence could exacerbate
existing tendencies to mete out death sentences more frequently to
killers of whites than to killers of blacks. 7
The dissenters in Booth and Gathers, who formed the core of the
Payne majority, do not seriously attempt to argue that victim impact
statements conform to the requirement that sentencing evidence relate
only to the defendant's character or circumstances of the crime. In-

stead, the proponents of victim impact statements take two completely
different approaches. The first approach is to attack the premises of

ing circumstance that is found in many death penalty statutes. See infra note 213.
This is one of the few circumstances in which I can conceive of victim impact evidence being
relevant to one of the statutory aggravating circumstances that are considered at the penalty
phase of a capital trial. In my modification of Justice Souter's hypothetical, the victim's testimony would be permitted because it is directly relevant to the primary issue at the proceeding,
just as the testimony in the hypothetical would be permitted at the guilt phase as proof that the
defendant actually committed the murder. The Booth rule would not prohibit the introduction
of victim impact evidence in either case. Booth held only that victim impact evidence cannot be
introduced if it does not provide proof either that the defendant committed first-degree murder
or that the defendant met one of the statutory aggravating circumstances.
35. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987).
36. Payne v. Tennessee, III S.Ct. 2597, 2631 (1991) (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
37.

See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND

(1990). The authors studied the operation of Georgia's death sentencing
system pre- and post-Furman. Their study indicates that there is a significant bias in murder
trials in the Georgia system based on the race of the victim. For example, the authors report that
"a logistic-regression analysis estimated that defendants with white victims face average odds of
receiving a death sentence that are 4.3 times larger than those faced by similarly situated defendants with black victims." Id. at 401. The post-Gregg pattern identified by the researchers continues the discriminatory pattern of Georgia death sentencing prior to Furman. Id. This evidence
was presented to the Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The fivemember majority held that although it was willing to assume the study was valid statistically, the
study was irrelevant to any individual defendant's case. According to the Court, the study "[a]t
most . . . indicat[ed] a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race," and given the importance of preserving the sentencer's discretion in capital cases, "we decline to assume that what is
unexplained is invidious." Id. at 312-13.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
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the Lockett and Eddings decisions, which established the sentencing
standards relied upon by the Booth/Gathers majority and the Payne
dissenters. The second approach is to argue that introduction of victim impact statements conforms to traditional standards relating to
the imposition of death sentences because the statements relate to the
defendant's personal responsibility and moral blameworthiness.
The next section will discuss the first approach-attacking the
premises of Lockett and Eddings-to justifying the introduction of
victim impact statements in capital trials. It will put the victim impact
statement cases in context as part of the ongoing debate within the
Court over the proper mix of state guidance and sentencer discretion
in death penalty cases. As this discussion will demonstrate, the practical debate about sentencing discretion provides an unsatisfactory resolution to the debate over capital sentencing. That debate can only be
resolved by reference to broader issues concerning the legitimacy of
the state interest in executing certain criminals, which are implicit in
Chief Justice Rehnquist's references in Payne to the defendant's personal responsibility and moral blameworthiness. The third section will
describe Justice Scalia's much more explicit rendition of this argument.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S UNHAPPY MARRIAGE OF GuIDANCE AND
DISCRETION IN DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING

As noted above, the dissenters in Payne argued that victim impact
statements should be excluded from the penalty phase of death penalty trials because such statements do not comply with requirements
imposed in cases such as Lockett v. Ohio and Eddings v. Oklahoma.38
The Payne dissenters read these cases to require that evidence at the
penalty phase should relate only to the character of the defendant or
the circumstances of the defendant's crime. The conservatives who
formed the Payne majority not only reject the dissenters' interpretation of the LockettlEddings standard, the conservatives implicitly
(and in Scalia's case, explicitly) reject the standard itself. No member
of the Payne majority has been as clearly antagonistic toward Lockett
and Eddings as Justice Scalia, who has said outright that Lockett and
Eddings should be overruled.3 9 However, the implications of the majority opinion in Payne and the dissents in the prior victim impact
statement cases cast considerable doubt on the continued viability of
the LockettlEddings standard.

38.
39.

See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3063 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

concurring in judgment). See also infra notes 99-123 and accompanying text.
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In his Payne majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist made only
the narrow argument that the Booth and Gathers majorities had "misread" the individualized sentencing language of Woodson v. North
Carolina from which the Court derived the LockettlEddings standard. 4° Rehnquist argued that the language in Woodson, Lockett, and
Eddings did not restrict the introduction of evidence at the penalty
phase as severely as the Payne dissenters contended. 41 Moreover, according to Rehnquist, the dissenters' "misreading" of Woodson's individualized sentencing requirement "unfairly weighted the scales in a
capital trial; while virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own
circumstances, the state is barred [from offering similar evidence
about the victim]. "42 Rehnquist contended that the Payne majority
was doing nothing more than correcting this evidentiary imbalance.
He-also contended that the only practical result of the majority opinion in Payne would be to give sentencers at capital trials more information with which to do their jobs.4 3 The Chief Justice even quoted
the plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, which was signed by the
author of the Booth majority opinion and a Payne dissenter, as support for his "more information is good" theory of capital sentencing. 44
In a narrow sense, Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct. The majority
in Booth and Gathers misread the individualized sentencing language
of Woodson, Lockett, and Eddings to the extent that they used the
holdings of those cases to limit prosecution-favorable evidence such as
victim impact statements. Properly understood, the logic of the individualized sentencing requirement stated in Woodson and subsequent
cases does not even apply to evidence that provides the jury with reasons supporting a sentence of death. The liberal evidentiary standard
of Lockett and Eddings logically should apply only to evidence that
tends to mitigate a death sentence. After all, the origin of the standard
was the Court's recognition that every capital trial may provide "compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
humankind. 45 In other words, the individualized sentencing require40. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (1991).
41.

Id. at 2600.

42. Id. at 2607.
43. "Victim impact evidence is simply another form or method of informing the sentencing
authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general type
long considered by sentencing authorities." Id. at 2608.
44. Id. at 2606 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976) (plurality opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision.")).
45. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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ment incorporates into death penalty jurisprudence the humanist recognition that the quality of mercy should be present in every trial
where someone's life is at stake. Lockett and Eddings require that the
sentencer always have the opportunity to avoid a death sentence based
on any evidence the defendant chooses to introduce.4
In contrast to the broad range of evidence the Court has permitted
sentencers to consider in mitigation of a death sentence, evidence supporting a death sentence-such as victim impact evidence-is governed by a completely different and far more restrictive standard.
Under most death penalty statutes, evidence supporting a death sentence must relate to specific, statutory aggravating factors. 47 The
Court emphasized the importance of these specific statutory factors
repeatedly in its 1976 decisions. 8
Before Payne, the closest a majority of the Court had come to endorsing Rehnquist's "more information is good" position regarding
prosecution-favorable evidence was in approving the Georgia death
penalty statute. 9 The Georgia statute permits jurors to consider evidence at the penalty phase that does not relate to the specific statutory
aggravating circumstances.5 0 Although the Court upheld the Georgia
statute, it conditioned its approval in several different ways. 5 Most
importantly, the Court used the individualized sentencing language

46. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 596 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
47. For a discussion of one typical statute, see infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193-98 (1976) (Georgia statute) and Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-53 (1976) (Florida statute). In addition, the Court approved the
Texas statute only after noting that the Texas system "serves much the same purpose" as the
enumerated factors in the Georgia and Florida statutes. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270
(1976). Also, the Texas murder statute used factors similar to the Georgia and Florida aggravating circumstances to define capital murder. "Thus, in essence, the Texas statute requires that the
jury find the existence of statutory aggravating circumstances before the death penalty may be
imposed." Id.
49. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (1978).
51. The Court emphasized that the Georgia statute, like those in other states, attempted to
channel the jury's sentencing discretion through the use of specific statutory aggravating factors.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97 (plurality opinion). Under the Georgia statute, the jury was required
to find at least one statutory aggravating factor before it could sentence a defendant to death.
The primary difference in the Georgia scheme was that it permitted the jury to go beyond the
statutory factors once the jury found at least one statutory factor. Thus, although non-statutory
aggravating evidence could be considered by the jury, such evidence could not be the sole basis
for a death sentence. Under the Georgia statute, non-statutory evidence could only augment
evidence that was relevant to the specific statutory factors. If no evidence was introduced to
support a statutory factor, the non-statutory evidence would be irrelevant in the jury's decision
regarding the death sentence. Thus, contrary to Chief Justice Rehnquist's implication in Payne,
see Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2606 (1991), the Court's opinion in Gregg did not
envision a wide-open penalty phase in which any evidence the prosecutor wanted to introduce
would be relevant to the sentence.
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from Lockett and Eddings to limit the aggravating evidence that could
legitimately be introduced at the penalty phase of a capital murder
trial: "What is important at the selection stage, is an individualized
determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the
circumstances of the crime." 52 This is the same language later used by
the Booth and Gathers majority to prohibit the use of victim impact
statements in capital trials." Thus, Rehnquist himself misreads the relevant precedents when he asserts that prior to the victim impact statement cases the Court always permitted the introduction of any
evidence either side wants to introduce at the penalty phase. 4 In fact,
the system established in 1976 limited the sentencer's access to information supporting a death sentence that did not conform to the defendant's character or crime.
A.

Discretion and Guidance: The BroaderDebate

In a sense, the whole debate in Payne over the scope of Woodson,
Lockett, and Eddings is beside the point. This debate is really only a
prelude to another, much broader debate over the use of discretion by
sentencers in death penalty cases. The conservative justices' rejection
of the limitations imposed in Booth and Gathers prepares the way for
.a wholesale attack on the more basic notion that the U.S. Constitution imposes any significant limitation on the extent to which the
states may dictate the breadth of capital sentencing proceedings. More
specifically, the conservatives on the Court seem prepared to abandon
the requirement that states strictly guide the capital sentencer's consid-

eration of aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase of capital
trials. This requirement was the focal point of the 1976 cases that reintroduced the death penalty to the American criminal justice system
and has been the lodestar of the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence ever since. Simultaneously, the Court seems willing to permit
52. Zant, 462 U.S. at 879. It is unfortunate that the majority in Zant used the Lockettl
Eddings language to limit the jury's consideration of non-statutory aggravating factors. This
removed the LockettlEddingsstandard from its original context and severed it from its original
justification-to give the jury the traditional right to exercise mercy in favor of the defendant.
This, in turn, gave ammunition to the Court's conservatives, who now argue that the spirit of
the LockettlEddings standard supports sentencer consideration of other types of aggravating
evidence at the penalty phase of capital trials. The conservatives argue that if (as the Zant majority implied) the Locketi/Eddings standard applies to aggravating evidence as well as mitigating
evidence, the same general objective should apply to both types of evidence (i.e., in a penalty
phase proceeding, more evidence is always better). The far better approach for the Zant majority
would have been to retract its approval of the Georgia statute granted in Gregg v. Georgia, and
to hold instead that only evidence relating to a specific statutory aggravating factor may be
considered at the penalty phase of a capital trial.
53. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
54. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606-07.
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the states much greater leeway to tighten restrictions on the introduction of mitigating evidence. The system seems headed in the direction
of permitting sentencers to exercise more discretion in imposing a
death sentence and less discretion in avoiding a death sentence.
A final, conclusive battle over the proper extent of discretion in
capital cases is inevitable. For two decades the Supreme Court has
vacillated between two inconsistent objectives in its capital punishment decisions. The Court's first objective is the elimination of discretion in capital sentencing. This objective is based on the Court's
conclusion that unfettered discretion leads to arbitrary and unpredictable imposition of the death penalty." The second objective is the
preservation of individualized sentencing in death penalty cases. As
noted above,5 6 this objective is rooted in the Court's insistence that the
sentencer recognize the unique nature of each individual crime and
defendant; it is also rooted in the Court's unwillingness to foreclose
the possibility of mercy in a capital trial.
The problem the Court has faced since it approved the new generation of capital punishment statutes in 1976 is that these two objectives
are ultimately inconsistent. The first objective requires the states to
guide the sentencer in a capital trial by expressly articulating the circumstances in which a death sentence may be imposed. Conversely,
the second objective prohibits the sentencer from channeling the discretion of a capital sentencer. Thus, the Court has produced a system
concisely described by the oxymoron "guided discretion."
Most of the time and effort spent by the Court on death penalty
issues since 1976 has been directed toward finding some satisfactory
middle ground that would permit the sentencer in a capital case to
exercise some, but not too much, discretion. The Court has never
found that middle ground. In each successive case the Court veered to
either the discretion side or the guidance side of the capital punishment equation. Often the Court would contradict itself by veering
back in the other direction only a year or two later. This process can
be seen in microcosm in the victim impact statement cases. In Booth
and Gathers, the Court's majority outlined a position of strict guidance, prohibiting the sentencer from hearing or seeing victim impact
evidence. 7 In Payne, the new conservative majority reverses field and
endorses a standard permitting broad jury discretion.18
55. The excess of discretion allowed under the prior generation of death penalty statutes
was the stated reason for the Court's striking down those statutes in 1972. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

56.
57.
(1987).
58.

See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
See South Carolina v. Gathers, 492 U.S. 938 (1989); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496
See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
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The broader significance of the Court's shift in Payne is discussed
by the Court only indirectly, in the guise of Justice Stevens' objection
that a victim impact statement "distracts the sentencer from the
proper focus of sentencing and encourages reliance on emotion and
other arbitrary factors."" 9 The broader problem to which Justice Stevens implicitly refers is the problem of widespread arbitrariness in the
imposition of the death penalty. This is what caused the Court to
overturn all existing death penalty statutes in 1972, and is the problem
that the system of "guided discretion" was intended to redress. Payne
is a precursor of the Court's surrender to the insuperable problem of
arbitrariness. Having tried for fifteen years to eliminate that problem,
the Court is now preparing to simply give up the effort in favor of
wholesale deference to state legislative choices concerning the mechanics of capital sentencing. To understand the significance of this decision, one must revisit briefly the beginnings of the system.
B.

"[Ciruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
' 0
lightning is cruel and unusual."

In Furman v. Georgia,"' the Supreme Court struck down the Georgia and Texas capital punishment statutes in a broad opinion that effectively invalidated all existing examples of the death penalty. Justice
White summarized the constitutional problem with the statutes on the
books as of 1972 as follows: "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from
the many cases in which it is not." 6 2 In short, the death penalty was a
purely arbitrary punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment; it
was cruel and unusual, as Justice Stewart's memorable phrase put it,
"in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."63

However, just one year before Furman, the Court ruled in McGautha v. California" that discretion-and thus a certain degree of
arbitrariness-is an unavoidable characteristic of every death penalty
sentencing scheme. According to Justice Harlan's majority opinion,
"To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to
express these characteristics in language which can be fairly under-

59.
60.

Id. at 2629 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972).

61.
62.
63.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 309 (Stewart, J.,concurring).

64.

402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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stood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks
which are beyond present human ability." 65 In particular, Justice Harlan derided the system of capital sentencing set forth in the Model
Penal Code, which proposed a bifurcated trial including a guilt phase
and a penalty phase.6 Under this bifurcated system, the penalty phase
would be conducted under the guidance of specific aggravating factors
set forth in the Code. According to Justice Harlan, the Model Penal
Code approach solved none of the due process problems asserted by
the McGautha petitioner:
It is apparent that such criteria [as those in the Model Penal Code]
do not purport to provide more than the most minimal control over
the sentencing authority's exercise of discretion. They do not purport
to give an exhaustive list of the relevant considerations or the way in
which they may be affected by the presence or absence of other
circumstances. .

..

And, of course, they provide no protection

against the jury determined to decide on whimsy or caprice. In short,
they do no more than suggest some subjects for the jury to consider
during its deliberations, and they bear witness to the intractable
nature of the problem of "standards" which67 the history of capital
punishment has from the beginning reflected.
It is impossible to reconcile the Court's approach in McGautha with
its approach one year later in Furman. The formal explanation for the
differences is that McGautha dealt with the problem of procedural
due process in capital cases and Furman dealt with the altogether different standards of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. But this explanation does not explain the very
different tone and focus in the opinions. As Robert Weisberg has
written, McGautha is characterized by the Court's criticism of the
death penalty opponents' "romantic utopianism" and "failure to
achieve tragic wisdom" with regard to the inherently arbitrary nature
of all criminal sentencing." By contrast, most of the opinions in Furman contain the implicit mandate that if the capital punishment system could not be made to operate objectively and predictably, such
that specific reasons could be identified to separate those who got the
death penalty from those who did not, then the system should cease to
operate at all.

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 204.
Id. at 205-07.
Id. at 207.
Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 310.
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At the time, many observers of the Court believed, along with several justices, that no system could meet the seemingly rigorous requirements of Furman.6 9 Yet a mere four years after Furman the
Court once again gave the states permission to sentence capital defendants to death, in a collection of opinions that attempted to meld the
two contrasting attitudes of McGautha and Furman.
C.

Gregg v. Georgia: Reconciling the Irreconcilable

In July 1976, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of five death
penalty statutes that had been enacted in response to Furman. Two of
the statutes, from North Carolina and Louisiana, represented a hamfisted mandatory sentencing approach to the arbitrariness of the preFurman death penalty.70 These statutes mandated a death penalty for
all defendants convicted of first-degree murder. Two more statutes,
from Georgia and Florida, used a modified Model Penal Code approach to the arbitrariness problem.7 These statutes established a bifurcated system of capital trials, including a separate penalty phase at
which the defendant was permitted to introduce evidence in mitigation
of the sentence and the sentencer's discretion was guided by specific
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. The final statute was an
idiosyncratic effort by Texas. 7 2 Like the Model Penal Code approach,
the Texas statute used a bifurcated trial system with a separate penalty
phase. However, the Texas penalty phase did not employ the typical
Model Penal Code set of aggravating and mitigating factors. Instead,
Texas sentencing juries were asked three questions: whether the murder was committed "deliberately," with the reasonable expectation
that death would result; whether the killing was unreasonable in response to any provocation by the victim; and-most importantly"whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society.""
The Court's approach to the statutory fallout from Furman was almost as diverse as the statutes themselves. The Court could not produce a majority opinion on the statutes. Two justices, Brennan and
69. The authors of The Brethren attribute to Chief Justice Burger the conclusion shared by
many that "[t]here will never be another execution in this country." See Boa WooDWARD &
ScoTT ARMSTRONG, TH-E BRETHIREN: INSIDE THE SuPREME COURT 219 (1979).

70.
(1976).
71.
72.
73.

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071(b) (Supp. 1975-76), quoted in Jurek, 428 U.S. at
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Marshall, voted to strike down all five statutes. Four justices, Burger,
Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun, voted to uphold all five statutes.
This left three justices, Stewart, Stevens, and Powell, willing to uphold the flexible approaches of the Florida, Georgia, and Texas statutes, but unwilling to approve the mandatory approach taken by
North Carolina and Louisiana. The plurality opinions produced by
these three justices set in motion the new system of capital punishment
in America. The internal contradictions in the plurality opinions issued in these five cases are responsible for much of the conceptual
disorder in the Court's subsequent death penalty decisions.
The plurality's approach in these cases attempted to split the difference between the McGautha decision's acceptance of unfettered sentencing discretion and the Furman decision's rejection of the
arbitrariness that pre-Furman sentencing discretion produced. The
plurality opinions discussing the Georgia and Florida statutes emphasized that the Model Penal Code approach adopted in modified form
by those states "provide guidance to the sentencing authority and
thereby reduce the likelihood that it will impose a sentence that fairly
can be called capricious or arbitrary. ' 4 Appellate review of the sentencer's application of these factors further assured that the pre-Furman situation would not be repeated. The plurality's Jurek v. Texas
opinion emphasized that the Texas approach similarly "provided a
means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition
of death sentences under law.""
When considering the mandatory death penalty approaches of
North Carolina and Louisiana, however, the plurality found that too
much rationality and consistency obscured the subjective human reality represented by every defendant. Death, the plurality noted, is qualitatively different from every other form of punishment.76 This
difference creates a "need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." 7 Therefore, a
death penalty statute must permit consideration of a defendant's character, the circumstances of the crime, and "the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
humankind."
1 have already noted how this language became a subject for dispute
in the victim impact statement cases.7 9 But the conceptual flaw that led
74. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 194-95 (footnote omitted).
75. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
76. Woodson v.North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 304.
79. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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to this later dispute was-evident in the 1976 plurality opinions. The
logical flaw in the 1976 mandatory death penalty decisions is that the
"need for reliability" in capital sentencing is irreconcilable with the
requirement that the jury consider any and all "compassionate or mitigating factors." The plurality opinion in Woodson asserts that the
mandatory death penalty statutes failed to solve the primary problem
identified in Furman: the arbitrary use of jury discretion to sentence
some defendants to death while refusing to impose the death sentence
on other, equally culpable defendants. 80 According to the plurality,
many juries operating under a mandatory statute would refuse to convict rather than subject the defendant to a mandatory death sentence. 8' The plurality found these arbitrary, unpredictable acquittals
indistinguishable from the arbitrary death sentences disavowed in Fur82
man .
But as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in dissent, the same sort of
arbitrariness characterizes the Model Penal Code-derived statutes.83
Under the Model Penal Code statutes a jury may also arbitrarily "acquit" a defendant of a death sentence by assigning unjustifiable significance to mitigating factors in the penalty phase of a capital trial.
In other words, both the mandatory and Model Penal Code systems
permit juries to ignore their charge and unjustifiably favor some defendants with something less than a death sentence. "To conclude
that the North Carolina system is bad because juror nullification may
permit jury discretion while concluding that the Georgia and Florida
systems are sound because they require this same discretion, is, as the
plurality opinion demonstrates, inexplicable.' "4 The potential for sentencing arbitrariness rises in direct proportion to the degree of the sentencer's discretion. Therefore, if the Court was right in Furman about
the evil of arbitrariness, then the plurality was wrong in Woodson
about the need for subjectivity and discretion. Conversely, if the plurality was right in Woodson about the need for discretion and subjectivity in capital sentencing, then it was wrong in Gregg about the need
to channel the sentencer's discretion strictly with regard to aggravating circumstances. All of modern death penalty law is built upon the
thin reed of this irreconcilable contradiction.
D.

Lockett v. Ohio: Building Upon the Contradiction

In the years following Gregg and Woodson, the contradictions in
those 1976 decisions have defined every aspect of the constitutional
80.
81.
82.

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 303.

83.
84.

Id. at 315 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.
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landscape surrounding capital punishment. Most of the confusion in
the post-Gregg cases can be traced back to the Gregg plurality's refusal to choose between two contradictory objectives: the elimination
of arbitrariness and the need to provide individualized consideration
of a defendant's personal characteristics before imposing a death sentence.
As noted above," the differential treatment of aggravating and mitigating factors in the Court's post-Gregg opinions is one of the more
important manifestations of the Court's indecisiveness. The treatment
of aggravating factors has been guided by the goal of eliminating discretion and thereby (theoretically) eliminating arbitrariness. The requirement that a state's statute clearly define the relevant aggravating
circumstances is intended both to guide the sentencer at trial and to
enable the state's supreme court to review each death sentence to ensure that death sentences throughout the state are being imposed rationally and proportionately. According to the Court, statutory
aggravating circumstances "must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to
6
others found guilty of murder."
Based on this principle, the Court has invalidated broad, openended aggravating circumstances that do not adequately channel jury
discretion, 7 prohibited the prosecutor or judge from minimizing the
jury's sense of responsibility in sentencing, 8 and (for a few years, anyway) restricted the use of victim impact statements at the penalty
phase of a capital trial.8 9 Despite some hedging, 90 until recently the

85. See supra notes 38-84 and accompanying text.
86. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
87. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (holding unconstitutionally vague
Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance) and Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding unconstitutionally vague Georgia's statutory aggravating
factor permitting the imposition of the death penalty if the jury finds the defendant's crime
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim").
88. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
89. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496
(1987). Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597 (1991), overruled Booth and Gathers.
90. As with every other aspect of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence, the Court has
created large loopholes that sharply reduce the effectiveness of the general rule. See, e.g., Lewis
v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990) (facially vague statutory aggravating circumstance nevertheless
satisfies constitutional requirement of channeling sentencer's discretion if state courts adopt and
apply a narrowing construction of statutory language); Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047
(1990) (defendants may be forced to bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of any mitigating circumstances and the sentencer may be told that he or
she "shall" impose a death sentence if the sentencer finds at least one aggravating circumstance
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principal holding of Gregg has survived intact: at least one, ostensibly
narrow, statutory aggravating circumstance is necessary to justify a
death sentence."
When the Court has considered mitigating factors, on the other
hand, it has been guided by the Woodson goal of sentencer discretion.
Lockett was the first indication of this strain of death penalty jurisprudence. 9 In Lockett the three members of the Gregg plurality,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, enlarged upon the Woodson individualized sentencing principle to hold that sentencers "[could] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." 93 Five years later, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,94 the Court removed whatever residual doubts existed about the strength of the
Lockett rule. "Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating
evidence." 95
After Lockett and Eddings, factual relevance is the only remaining
limitation on the consideration of mitigating evidence at a capital
trial. But Lockett and Eddings are premised on the notion that everything about the defendant's character or background is relevant to
mitigation, which makes every piece of evidence the defendant seeks
to introduce at the penalty phase relevant to the sentencer's decision.
As a practical matter, therefore, Lockett and Eddings removed all
limitations on the introduction and consideration of mitigating evidence and subordinated the value of consistency to the value of mercy
(or at least the chance for mercy). As the Court explained in Eddings,

and does not find any offsetting mitigating circumstances); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738
(1990) (state appellate court may reweigh evidence introduced at trial in order to uphold death
penalty based in part on unconstitutional aggravating circumstance); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S.
37 (1984) (state appellate courts are not required to conduct comparative proportionality review
of each death sentence to ensure that similarly situated defendants receive similar sentences);
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (under Georgia statute, death sentence may be upheld
despite state court ruling holding unconstitutional one of the three aggravating circumstances on
which the sentence was imposed by jury).
91. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
92. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
93. Id. at 604 (emphasis omitted). The Court left open the possibility that such evidence
could be barred under a statute providing for mandatory death sentences in situations where a
murder is committed by a prisoner or escapee serving a life sentence. In 1987 the Court held that
even these narrow mandatory death penalty statutes violated the Woodson principles and were
therefore unconstitutional. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
94. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
95. Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted).
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"By holding that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to
consider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes
that a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a
false consistency."96 But if a system counter to Lockett would provide
a false consistency, the system under Lockett denies even the pretense
of consistency.
The contradictions in the 1976 plurality opinions provided the
Court's conservatives with a ready-made framework for attacking
Gregg and the system it established. In Lockett, for example, thenJustice Rehnquist argued in dissent that Gregg's objective of eliminating arbitrariness and making death sentences predictable was inconsistent with permitting sentencers to consider "anything under the sun as
a 'mitigating circumstance." '' 97 Then, in Payne, Chief Justice
Rehnquist uses the LockettlEddings principle of broad sentencing discretion as his rationale for overturning Booth's limitations on the use
8
of evidence unrelated to statutory aggravating circumstances.
It is significant that Rehnquist was the lone dissenter in Lockett,
while he wrote the majority opinion in Payne. Now that the conservatives have a firm majority on the Court, the Gregg system will quickly
collapse on itself. Payne may represent the beginning of that process.
If that is the case, then Justice Scalia has written the blueprint for the
new system. In the next section, I will describe Justice Scalia's proposed brave new world of death penalty jurisprudence.

III.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S DEATH PENALTY, PART

I

Two years ago, Justice Scalia wrote a long opinion outlining a position on Lockett that I suspect several other conservative justices also
silently endorse. 9 In Scalia's concurring opinion in Walton v. Arizona,'00 he argued that the Court should allow states to limit consideration of mitigating evidence in death penalty trials. Three years before
Walton, Justice Scalia wrote a short dissent in Booth that attacked the
premises of the Court's restrictions on consideration of aggravating
evidence.101 This position was later incorporated into Chief Justice

d.at 112.
96.
97. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 631 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2606-07 (1991).
99. At least two other justices have previously written opinions using anti-Lockett arguments similar to Scalia's. Then-Justice Rehnquist dissented in Lockett on essentially the same
grounds Justice Scalia employed in Walton. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 628 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice White also relied on many of these arguments in his dissent to the 1976 plurality's mandatory death penalty decisions in Woodson and Roberts v. Louisiana. See Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325, 358-63 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
100. 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3058 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
101. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 519 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Rehnquist's majority opinion in Payne.' 2 When Justice Scalia's Walton opinion is read in conjunction with his Booth opinion, the resulting doctrine amounts to a wholesale reversal of the Supreme Court's
death penalty jurisprudence that has developed since Gregg.
In this section I will first describe Justice Scalia's attacks on Lockett
and Gregg. I will then discuss a more intricate issue raised by Scalia's
Booth opinion. In Booth, having urged the Court to begin dismantling the elaborate legal apparatus for carrying out the death penalty,
Scalia returns the death penalty debate to the more basic issue of constitutional legitimacy, which was never satisfactorily addressed in the
Court's 1976 opinions. I will discuss this issue in detail in the next two
sections.
A.

Scalia'sRejection of UnguidedDiscretion

In the current legal atmosphere, Walton v. Arizona is an unremarkable decision. The case was one of ten death penalty cases decided in
the Court's 1989 term, at least eight of which represented defeats for
death penalty opponents. 03 In Walton, the Court upheld the Arizona
death penalty statute. A four-member plurality (composed of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy) held,
among other things, that the Arizona statute did not violate the principles of Lockett by requiring that defendants in capital trials prove
by a preponderance of the evidence all mitigating circumstances calling for a sentence other than death.104 The same four-member plurality held that the Arizona statute did not violate Woodson's
prohibition of mandatory death sentencing schemes by requiring that
the judge "shall" impose the death penalty if one or more aggravating
circumstances are found. 105

102. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2605 (1991).
103. See Walton; Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990); Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822
(1990); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738
(1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990);
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 379 (1990); Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). Only McKoy and Clemons could be considered victories for
death penalty opponents. (And minor victories at that: McKoy has no bearing outside North
Carolina, and Clemons established a standard that would disadvantage future appellants in
death penalty cases.) I note this fact as evidence for my contention that the new conservative
majority is aggressively seeking to eliminate existing restrictions on executions.
The Court's 1990 Term was no more encouraging to the denizens of death row. Payne was one
of six death penalty cases decided in the 1990 Term. Four of these cases resulted in rulings
favoring the prosecution. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Schad v. Arizona,
II1 S. Ct. 2491 (1991); Lankford v. Idaho, III S. Ct. 1723 (1991); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S.
Ct. 1454 (1991); Parker v. Dugger, Ill S. Ct. 731 (1991).

104.
105.

Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3055-56 (1990).
Id.at 3056.
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Justice Scalia provided the fifth vote on the Lockett and Woodson
issues, but based his vote on a much broader rationale than did the
four-member plurality. Justice Scalia argued that the Court should
simply overrule Lockett and Woodson.' 6 Overruling those cases is
necessary, Scalia argued, because they are irreconcilable with the principle of limited discretion that is at the heart of Furman.0 7 Justice
Scalia announced that, insofar as "our jurisprudence and logic have
long since parted ways," ' t° he would no longer apply either Woodson
or Lockett.
As the previous section of this Article demonstrates, 09 the first step
in an attack on Lockett is easy: simply reiterate the arguments in the
1972 and 1976 decisions of the moderate members of the Court who
provided the deciding votes in Furman and Gregg. As Scalia notes,
this moderate faction on the Court assumed that "capital punishment
was not in itself a cruel and unusual punishment""l 0 and that the real
problem lay in the inadequate mechanisms used to impose the death
penalty in the period leading up to Furman. Scalia then documents
extensively the process, starting with Gregg, by which the Court set
about elaborating upon the principle that "capital sentencing procedures must constrain and guide the sentencer's discretion to ensure
'that the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily and capriciously."'"'
According to Scalia, the Woodson/Lockett/Eddings doctrine of individualized sentencing and unlimited discretion regarding mitigation
evidence "has completely exploded whatever coherence the notion of
'guided discretion' once had."" 2 Scalia snidely dismisses notions that
the standards regarding aggravating and mitigating evidence serve different purposes. Alluding to the "twin objectives" of aggravating and
mitigating factors, Scalia says, "is rather like referring to the twin objectives of good and evil. They cannot be reconciled."" ' If you are
going to stand by Furman and Gregg, Scalia tells his fellow justices,
4
then you have to give up Woodson and Lockett.1
106. Id. at 3058 (Scalia, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 3067 (Scalia, I., concurring).
108. Id. at 3059 (Scalia, J., concurring).
109. See supra notes 38-98 and accompanying text.
110. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3060 (1990) (Scalia, J.,concurring).
111. Id. at 3061 (Scalia, J.,concurring) (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999
(1983)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 3063 (Scalia, J.,concurring).
114. This ultimatum is not due to any special concern about the importance of the guideddiscretion rules in correcting the arbitrariness found in pre-1972 death penalty statutes. Scalia is
simply exhibiting a sportsman's concern for fair play. He seeks only to ensure that both players
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In place of Woodson and Lockett, Scalia offers a constitutional
standard defined by a Gregg-derived rationality standard. Under Scalia's standard, the Court would defer to legislative judgments about
the number and breadth of both aggravating and mitigating factors
relevant to capital sentencing determinations, limited only by the
Gregg requirement that all capital punishment schemes provide some
rational means of separating defendants who are eligible for the death
penalty from those who are not.'" Therefore, states presumably could
exclude from the penalty phase much of what is typically introduced
116
in current capital trials.
Other than allowing states to restrict the amount of mitigating evidence introduced at death penalty trials, the major practical consequence of Scalia's approach in Walton would be to reintroduce
mandatory death sentences to the American criminal justice system.
Indeed, Scalia explicitly endorses the constitutionality of mandatory
death sentences.' 7 It is in the context of this discussion that Scalia
discusses briefly his conception of the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth
Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments."" 8 In Scalia's view, the amendment's two operative terms"cruel" and "unusual"-both must be satisfied before the courts will
strike down a punishment scheme chosen by a state: "[Tihe Amendment explicitly requires a court to consider not only whether the penalty is severe or harsh, but also whether it is 'unusual.' If it is not,
then the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit it, no matter how cruel
a judge might think it to be.""19

in the death penalty game-lawyers for the prosecution and lawyers for the defense-be permitted to play by the same rules. The sportsman Scalia would be equally happy to abandon the
guidance requirement dictated by Furman in favor of a wide-open, totally unguided system
played with Lockett rules applied to both the prosecution's aggravating evidence and the defense's mitigating evidence. See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3063-64 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring) ("If
and when the Court redefines Furman to permit [sentencers to be given complete discretion without a requisite finding of aggravating factors] ... I shall be prepared to reconsider my evaluation of Woodson and Lockett.").
115. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring).
116. Scalia derides the scope and nature of such evidence with a few examples:
that the defendant had a poor and deprived childhood, or that he had a rich and
spoiled childhood; that he had a great love for the victim's race, or that he had a
pathological hatred for the victim's race; that he has a limited mental capacity, or that
he has a brilliant mind which can make a great contribution to society; that he was
kind to his mother, or that he despised his mother.
Id. at 3062 (Scalia, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 3067 (Scalia, J., concurring).
118. U.S. COrrST. amend. VIII.
119. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3066 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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This interpretation allows Scalia to omit discussion of the death
penalty's cruelty' 20 and to pass immediately to the argument that the
death penalty is "unusual." Scalia first implies that he would adopt a
narrower version of the term "unusual" than the Stewart and White
plurality opinions in Furman (whose concerns later formed the basis
for the plurality opinions in the 1976 cases)., 1 Justices Stewart and
White understood the term "unusual" to mean infrequently imposed.
(Hence, Justice Stewart's comparison of a death sentence with a lightning strike.) 12 2 Justice Scalia hints that he would prefer a far less protective interpretation, which would permit "traditional form[s] of
punishment that [are] rarely imposed."' 23 But he acknowledges that
the term "can bear the former meaning,"' 24 and thus is willing to acknowledge that the Eighth Amendment requires the states to avoid the
"unusual" imposition of the death penalty in the sense of "rarely imposed."'2 Unfortunately for capital defendants, this leads Scalia to
the point reached by Justice White in 1972: the problem with the
death penalty is not that too many executions are being carried out,
but rather that too few are being carried out. 26 Thus, the solution to
the arbitrariness problem is to permit states to increase the number of
death sentences imposed through means such as mandatory death sentencing statutes.

120. However, Scalia makes clear that he does not think the death penalty is cruel. In stating
his view that mandatory death sentences are constitutional, he notes in passing that such sentences are not cruel "[either] absolutely [or] for the particular crime." Id.at 3067 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Omitting a more elaborate discussion of the term "cruel" permits Justice Scalia to
avoid discussing the two other rationales used by the Woodson plurality for invalidating mandatory death sentences-that there is an overwhelming present social consensus against the use of
mandatory death sentences and that mandatory death sentences violate the "fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 3090 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
121. See Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3066 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
122. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
123. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3066 (Scalia, J.,concurring). This interpretation follows from
Justice Scalia's general approach to constitutional interpretation, which emphasizes the use of
historical tradition to give meaning to constitutional terms and interprets historical tradition at
the lowest possible level of generality. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6
(1989).
124. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3066 (Scalia, J.,concurring).
125. Id.
126.
Ibegin with what I consider a near truism: that the death penalty could so seldom be
imposed that it would cease to be a credible deterrent or measurably to contribute to
any other end of punishment in the criminal justice system .... [W]hen imposition of
the penalty reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any
existing general need for retribution would be measurably satisfied.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
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Scalia's Rejection of Guided Discretion

Justice Scalia premises his rejection of the Woodson/Lockett/Eddings line of cases on the need to preserve the central principle of Furman. The core requirement of Furman, which even Justice Scalia
accepted in Walton, 2 ' is that a state system imposing death sentences
must be systematic and rational to pass constitutional muster. 2 ' Furman especially demands that sentencer discretion must be constrained
by law. If Justice Scalia were serious about upholding this core function of Furman, one might expect him to apply stringent relevance
requirements to the statutory standards used by the states in defining
the category of defendants eligible for a death sentence. One also
might expect him to apply equally rigorous relevance standards to evidence introduced at the penalty phase of capital trials. Yet Justice
Scalia has not been especially vigilant in either regard. Indeed, in contrast to Scalia's extended paean in Walton to strict constraints on sentencer consideration of mitigation evidence, his attitude toward
sentencer discretion to consider aggravating evidence has been far
more lenient.
Even in Walton itself, one sees evidence of Scalia's laissez-faire attitude toward limiting prosecutors' use of broad, ill-defined aggravating
circumstances in death penalty trials. In Walton and Lewis v. Jeffers, 29 the Court upheld an aggravating factor of the Arizona death
penalty statute that permitted the imposition of a death sentence if the
defendant committed the murder in an "especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved manner."' 30 Problems arising from the application of similar aggravating factors in other statutes have bedeviled the Court since
Gregg itself. 3 '

127.

Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3067 (Scalia, J.,concurring).

128.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

129.
130.
131.
cruel");
cruel");

110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990).
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (17)(6) (1989).
See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 741 (1990) ("especially heinous, atrocious, or
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 359 (1988) ("especially heinous, atrocious, or
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 422 (1980) ("outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible,

or inhuman"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman"); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976) ("especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"). The Walton and Jeffers defendants' complaints about the

Arizona "especially heinous" factor followed the pattern of complaints about other versions of
this factor considered by the Court in previous cases. Reduced to its essence, the claim is simply
that phrases such as "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" have no inherently obvious meaning that
would distinguish one murder case from another. In the common use of the terms, every murder
is heinous, atrocious, and cruel, especially to jurors who are unlikely to judge more than one
death penalty case in their lives and are likely to be insensitive to the gradations of aggravation
that the Gregg system requires. Therefore, the argument goes, "especially heinous" factors do
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In Walton, the Court upheld Arizona's use of the term "cruel" as
an aggravating factor, despite only dubious efforts by the Arizona
courts to limit the definition of that term. 32 At least the term "cruel"
warranted some discussion by the Court. In Jeffers, the Court upheld
the "heinous . . . or depraved" terms of the Arizona statute without
any substantive discussion at all.'33 The Court simply cited a single
boilerplate line in the Walton majority opinion, which was issued the

not provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Or, as another author has summed up the "especially heinous" argument, "These aggravating circumstances ... have generated more controversy than any other aggravating
circumstance. Commentators have universally criticized them as vague, overbroad, and meaningless." Richard A. Rosen, The "E4pecially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital
Cases- The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REv. 941, 943-44 (1986).
132. The Arizona courts had followed the usual pattern of states with similar statutory provisions. First, the Arizona courts attempted to flesh out the terms used in the statute with the
dictionary definitions of those terms. See State v. Knapp, 562 P.2d 704, 716 (Ariz. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). As the Arizona experience indicates, such definitions usually do
little more than add indefinite descriptions of the original indefinite term. The dictionary definition used by the Arizona Supreme Court to define the vague term "cruel" is "disposed to inflict
pain esp. in a wanton, insensate or vindictive manner." Id. Perhaps recognizing that this definition added little of substance to the original term, the Arizona court then took the second typical
step in bolstering the definition of the statutory term "cruel": specifying particular factual circumstances that would establish the requisite "cruelty." See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047,
3078-82 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The problem with this second step is that the list of
factual circumstances capable of satisfying this factor was never deemed finite. Thus, each new
case involving the term "cruel" could theoretically add yet another factual example of the condition. The end result is that the statutory term fails to serve its intended function of distinguishing
rationally the murders that deserve punishment by death from those that do not. Or, as Justice
Blackmun concluded in his Walton dissent, "the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of 'cruelty' has become so broad that it imposes no meaningful limits on the sentencer's discretion."
Id. at 3080 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. 110 S. Ct. 3092. The Arizona Supreme Court followed the same pattern in interpreting
the terms "heinous" and "depraved" as it did in interpreting "cruel." However, the court outdid itself in describing factual circumstances indicating the existence of heinousness or depravity.
In State v. Correll, the court held that a killer's "total disregard for human life" would satisfy
the "heinous ... and depraved" statutory terms and therefore subject the killer to a death
sentence. 715 P.2d 721, 734 (Ariz. 1986). By the odd logic of the Arizona Supreme Court, it
should be possible (because Arizona's statute does not require mandatory death sentences for all
first-degree murderers) to be convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona without having displayed a "total disregard for human life." But because the Arizona statute provides that a person commits first-degree murder if "[i]ntending or knowing that his conduct will cause death,
such person causes the death of another with premeditation," ARIZ. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 131I05(A)(I) (1989), we know that it is not possible to be convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona without exhibiting a "total disregard for human life." Therefore, either the Arizona statute
mandates a death sentence for every first-degree murderer, which is unconstitutional under
Woodson, or the aggravating circumstance in question does not narrow the set of first-degree
murderers at all, which is unconstitutional under Gregg, or Arizona's is a totally arbitrary system in which any first-degree murderer may be subjected to a death sentence on the whim of the
jury and courts, which is unconstitutional under Furman. Yet the United States Supreme Court
held the Arizona statute constitutional in Walton and Jeffers. Readers stymied by such logical
conundrums should steer well clear of modern death penalty law.
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same day, in holding that Walton forecloses claims against any aspect
of the Arizona "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating
factor. 3 4 Justice Scalia joined the majority in upholding the constitutionality of the Arizona "especially heinous" aggravating factor, adding in Walton only the offhand remark that Arizona's statute is
"precise enough, in my view, both to guide the sentencer and to enable review of the sentence."' 35
Scalia's unconcerned acceptance of Arizona's problematic guided
discretion statute is but one indication that perhaps Scalia is not as
enthusiastic about Furman and Gregg as his Walton concurrence
would have us believe. Scalia's approach to the victim impact statement cases is another, ultimately far more important indication that
the "guided discretion" system may soon be robbed of any substance.
These opinions are important in two respects. First, they reveal Scalia's implicit rejection of the premises of Furman and Gregg and his
insensitivity to the problem of arbitrariness that motivated the plurality opinions in those cases. Second, in these opinions Scalia proposes
a framework for a new set of presumptions about the constitutional
purposes of capital punishment. Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted a
portion of the Scalia approach in his Payne majority opinion. 3 6 If the
Court adopted Scalia's attitude and approach in toto, it would have
the effect of overruling Furman and Gregg in all but name. The majority's cavalier attitude toward the essence of the "guided discretion"
scheme in Walton and Jeffers indicates that a sub silentio overruling
of Furman and Gregg would cause little grief among Scalia's conservative colleagues.

134. Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3100 (1990). The problem with the majority's approach is that the Arizona courts had interpreted the "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved"
factor as disjunctive; each term meant something different, and the presence of facts supporting
any one term was enough to establish the existence of the aggravating circumstance, See State v.
Beaty, 762 P.2d 519, 529 (Ariz. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989). Indeed, in Jeffers itself
the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that although the defendant's murder was "heinous . . . and
depraved," it did not satisfy the "cruel" component of the statutory term. State v. Jeffers, 661
P.2d 1105, 1130-31 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983). Since the "depraved" component
of the statute has a different meaning than the "cruel" component, the Supreme Court's discussion of the "cruel" component at issue in Walton is irrelevant to the consideration of the "depraved" component at issue in Jeffers.
The United States Supreme Court can communicate to lower courts just as strongly through
its attitude and style of deciding a case as it can through explicit statements in a particular decision. Thus, the Jeffers majority's refusal to address the subtle distinctions between the two Arizona statutory terms communicates something very important to state courts attempting to
comply with Gregg's guidance requirement: the subtleties of interpreting statutory aggravating
circumstances no longer matter.
135. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3068 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
136. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2605 (1991).
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The Scalia opinions in the victim impact statement cases are short
and deceptively indirect. Scalia's dissent in Booth is the more important opinion.'37 However, at first glance, Scalia's dissent does not
seem even to address the main points of the Booth majority opinion.
As noted in Section I above, Justice Powell's majority opinion in
Booth makes three main points about victim impact statements in
death penalty trials, each of which draws on concepts central to Furman and Gregg. Justice Powell objects to the introduction of victim
impact statements at capital trials on the grounds that such statements
(1) do not relate to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of his crime;138 (2) imply "that defendants whose victims were
assets to their community are more deserving of punishment than
those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy; "' 39 and (3) would
"serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury," thus leading to a
sentence "inconsistent with the reasoned decision-making we require
in capital cases.' ' 14
Instead of directing his criticism to these points, Scalia addresses
the core principle informing all three of Justice Powell's objectionsthe notion that the Constitution requires the capital punishment system to inflict the death penalty only upon defendants with a certain
level of moral guilt. Justice Powell's position in Booth is that victim
impact statements are irrelevant to ascertaining moral guilt.141 Justice
Scalia's response is that moral guilt is not necessarily the most impor4
tant factor in the sentencer's decision to impose the death penalty. 1
Scalia argues that the imposition of the death penalty does not depend only on moral guilt, because the requisite level of moral guilt
may be present even though no killing occurs. 143 To illustrate this
point, Scalia offers this hypothetical:1 44 A person who drives sixty
miles per hour through a residential area and does not hit anyone will
be guilty of a traffic offense and nothing more. However, if he hits
and kills a pedestrian, he may be charged with manslaughter. Scalia
asserts that the driver has the same measure of moral guilt regardless
of whether he hits the pedestrian, yet he will be subject to a manslaughter charge only if the killing occurs. 45 From this example,

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 519 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 502-05.
Id. at 506 n.8.
Id. at 508-09 (footnote omitted).
ld. at 502-06.
Id. at 519-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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Scalia deduces that the applicability of criminal law generally, and the
death penalty particularly, is based on defendants' moral guilt and on
their "personal responsibility," which Scalia defines as "the degree of
harm that:they had caused."' 4 Therefore, Scalia argues, victim impact statements are relevant in death penalty trials because they "lay
before the sentencing authority the full reality of human suffering the
47
defendant has produced."
Justice Scalia's approach is contrary to the spirit of the Woodson/
Lockett/Eddings line of decisions, each of which is premised on the
notion that the defendant's moral culpability is the key to whether he
or she may be sentenced to death. This is not surprising because
Justice Scalia subsequently stated in Walton that he would overrule
those decisions.' 4 The relationship between Scalia's arguments in
Booth and the principles of Gregg is more complicated and will be
explored at length in the next two sections. Scalia identifies a major
conceptual weakness in the Gregg scheme, but even Scalia's own approach to the death penalty contains a number of serious logical
flaws. Thus, it is possible to make a strong argument against Scalia's
assertions about both moral guilt and personal responsibility without
revisiting Gregg.
Scalia argues in Booth that a death sentence may sometimes be justified because of a defendant's "personal responsibility" (i.e., the extent of harm caused by the defendant's crime) rather than the
defendant's "moral guilt.' ' 49 The argument against Scalia's de-emphasis of moral guilt in death penalty proceedings can be illustrated
by a modified version of Scalia's own hypothetical about the speeder
in a residential neighborhood. Suppose that instead of one driver,
there are two drivers cruising through a residential neighborhood at
sixty miles per hour. Driver one is taking his wife to the hospital at
midnight because she has a life-threatening heart condition and is suffering from severe chest pains. Driver one hits and kills a sixty-fiveyear-old woman who is wandering around the neighborhood looking
for her lost cat. The woman has thirteen grandchildren who love her
very much. Driver two is drunk and careening through the neighborhood in the late afternoon. He speeds past a stopped school bus, then
hits and kills a person lying beside the road. The victim is an unemployed fifty-year-old man who has a long record of minor criminal
convictions, lives alone, and has no family and few friends. The un-

146.
147.

Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

148.
149.

See supra notes 99-126 and accompanying text.
See 482 U.S. at 519-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id.
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fortunate victim was himself drunk. He was returning home after
drinking at a local bar all day, but passed out beside the road.
The implications of the modified hypothetical are obvious: Driver
two has by far a greater quantum of "moral guilt" than driver one.
He was driving very recklessly, in an impaired condition, and in a situation where children and other people are likely to be on the road. A
properly conducted trial of driver two will focus on this fact. Likewise, a trial of driver one will focus on the fact that although his actions were reckless, they are excusable in part because of the
understandable pressures of the circumstances. The identity and characteristics of the victims in the two cases are relevant only insofar as
they help the jury answer the single question legitimately at issue in
each case: What did the defendant do and why did he do it? The fact
that driver one caused a great deal more harm than driver two 50 isand should be-irrelevant to the sentencer's decision about the respective drivers' punishments.
This modified hypothetical reflects the reality of the death penalty
sentencing situation much more accurately than Justice Scalia's version of the hypothetical. In Justice Scalia's version one driver behaves
in exactly the same way, but driver one does not hit anyone and driver
two kills a pedestrian. The victim, not the driver, is the focal point of
Scalia's hypothetical because the victim is the only variable that distinguishes the two situations. But in death penalty trials the identity and
characteristics of the victim are a distraction from the main point of
what the defendant did and why he did it.
Scalia is accurate but misleading when he asserts that moral guilt is
not the sole concern of the jury at the penalty phase of a death penalty trial.' Scalia is accurate because at every capital trial the jury
must find the requisite level of "personal responsibility" before even
considering the possibility of imposing a death sentence. In other
words, the penalty phase of a death penalty trial can only take place if
the jury has already determined that the defendant is "personally responsible" for the murder of another human being. But Scalia's assertion is misleading because once this threshold level of "personal
responsibility" has been met, the focus of the trial shifts to the defendant's actions, and the victim is largely irrelevant to the main objective of the remaining proceedings.
Another problem with Scalia's proposed focus on "personal responsibility" and on the identity of the victim is that Scalia himself

150. That is, driver one killed a more compelling victim, whose death will adversely affect a
larger number of people.
151. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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undoubtedly would refuse to carry his proposal to its logical conclusion. This is best illustrated by considering how Scalia would treat information about a victim who was less upstanding, well known, and
beloved than the victims in Booth.'52 According to Scalia, victim impact statements are relevant because they give the jury a more accurate idea of the degree of harm the defendant has caused. In Booth
that harm was greater because the victims' deaths had a significant
effect on the lives of several surviving family members."5 3 Thus, according to Scalia, the family members could testify about these effects, and the prosecutor could ask the judge to instruct the members
of the jury that they could consider these effects in reaching their verdict as to Booth's sentence.
But if Scalia is correct that sentencing juries can ascribe to a defendant greater personal responsibility in cases in which the victims' lives
touch and positively influence many other lives, then, conversely, he
must also believe that personal responsibility for murder is lower
when the victim is an unimportant individual having little contact
with, much less influence on, other human beings. If Scalia is correct
about the premises and purposes of death sentencing, then the defendant in Gathers should have been permitted to have the judge instruct
the jury that the victim's relative lack of importance or influence
should be used as a mitigating factor in deciding whether Gathers
5 4
would be sentenced to death.
Scalia's argument is that murderers should be held accountable for
any effect the murder has on others in society. The penalty should be
more severe, Scalia asserts, if the effects of killing a particular victim
are greater than normal. Stated,in abstract terms, this is a utilitarian
argument that society should be permitted to interpret its criminal law
in a manner that provides the strongest protection to society's more
valuable human assets. Scalia suggests that death penalty juries should
be shown the "amount of harm [the defendant) has caused."' 55 In
Booth that harm was emotional, and the persons harmed were the immediate family members. But harms resulting from a murder are not
just emotional, and the ancillary victims are not only family members.

152. The victims in Booth were described by family members as "loving parents and grandparents whose family was most important to them .... [They] were extremely good people who
wouldn't hurt a fly." Booth, 496 U.S. at 514 (appendix to opinion of the Court).
153. Id. at 510-15. See also supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
154. The victim in Gathers was a 31-year-old unemployed man who had a history of mental
problems. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 807 (1989).
155. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Others in society also suffer harm as a result of a murder.1 6 Employers are harmed by the loss of productive workers. The community is
harmed by the loss of citizens who contribute their time and energy to
serve the commonweal. Indeed, society in the broadest collective sense
is harmed by every murder to the degree that society's educational and
financial investment will never be repaid by a victim whose life is
ended prematurely.
This larger context of Scalia's argument suggests the permissibility
of some sort of utility calculus that would be stated specifically in capital punishment statutes. Under such a calculus, persons having partic17
ular characteristics would be assigned higher relative social values.
Highly educated persons would be assigned a higher value than high
school dropouts, for example. Persons possessing highly specialized
skills would be assigned higher values than fungible generalists. Rich
people would be assigned higher values than poor people, based on
the higher tax revenues produced by the rich persons, the number of
jobs created by the expenditure of funds by rich persons, and the recognized social value already assigned by the market, which allocates
economic resources to their most efficient use."'
Of course, the use of a utility calculus would only accentuate the
differential treatment of these categories of victims. But under Scalia's rationale, different categories of victims should get different treatment. In general, society benefits more from its more prosperous,
better educated, more highly skilled, and more politically involved
members, and therefore it is only logical that society should protect
those persons more rigorously.
I suggest this utility calculus partly tongue-in-cheek and partly to
make clear where Scalia's proposals lead. I stated earlier that Scalia
would not follow his proposals to their logical conclusion. But maybe
I am wrong. Scalia himself says:
Perhaps these sentiments do not sufficiently temper justice with
mercy, but that is a question to be decided through the democratic
processes of a free people, and not by the decrees of this Court.
There is nothing in the Constitution that dictates the answer, no
more in the field of capital punishment than elsewhere. 1 9

156. Justice White, who joined Justice Scalia's Booth opinion, also wrote a separate dissent
in which he explicitly expanded the notion of victim impact from the immediate family to society
at large. Id. at 517 n.2 and accompanying text (White, J., dissenting).
157. As Justice White pointed out in Booth, society already does this to some extent by
authorizing the death sentence for the killing of certain political officials and police officers. See
id. (White, J., dissenting).
158. See generally RIcHAaRD POSNER, EcoNo ac ANALYsis OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
159. Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In this statement, you have a glint of Scalia's true position. Scalia's
Walton concurrence notwithstanding, his position is not that the
Court must choose between the strict sentencing guidance mandated
by the Furman/Gregg line of decisions and the absolute sentencing
discretion mandated by the Woodson/Lockett line of decisions. Scalia's position is much more radical: Both the Gregg principles and the
Woodson/Lockett principles are derived from an improperly expansive interpretation of the Constitution. Contrary to the interpretation
represented by these decisions, Scalia seems to believe that there are
virtually no constitutional limits on a state's imposition of the death
penalty.
The scorched-earth approach undertaken by Justice Scalia does
have one hidden benefit: It returns the death penalty debate to original principles. One problem the Court has had in judging death penalty cases is that it has focused almost exclusively on how the states
may impose the death penalty and only superficially on why the states
may impose the death penalty. Scalia's attack on the mechanistic/
technical approach to death penalty law at least returns the Court to
the point where it must consider the states' asserted purposes for
which the death penalty may be used. Scalia's Booth opinion suggests
several justifications for the death penalty, and also suggests that
Scalia sees no constitutional problem with these justifications. As the
next two sections will demonstrate, Scalia's arguments do point out a
significant flaw in the Court's Gregg analysis. However, Scalia's arguments are also flawed-and in a much grander way. Ironically, Scalia's arguments against Gregg may have an effect that is exactly the
opposite of what he intends: What is proposed as an attack on the
system limiting the states' freedom to impose the death penalty has
the effect of undercutting the constitutional justification for any system of capital punishment.
IV.

THE PENALTY WITHOUT A PURPOSE: RETRIBUTION, DETERRENCE,
AND THE DEATH PENALTY

The Court has been vexed by a dilemma of its own making ever
since it permitted the states to reintroduce the death penalty in 1976.
The dilemma is posed by the two objectives that came out of the
Court's 1976 decisions: the elimination of arbitrariness and the preservation of individualized sentencing. 16° Both objectives are laudable.

160. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Indeed, I believe the Court is correct in holding that both objectives
are constitutionally mandated. But conservatives such as Scalia are
also correct in observing that the two objectives are irreconcilable in
the bifurcated system created by Gregg.'6' As Scalia argues in Walton, 62 the jury at the penalty phase of a Gregg-style trial is either
given discretion or it isn't. This dilemma has led conservative justices
such as Scalia to argue that the Court cannot accomplish the task it
set for itself in its mid-1970s capital-punishment decisions. The conservatives argue that the Court should simply get out of the death penalty business by eliminating most constitutional rules restricting state
imposition of capital punishment.
The premise of this Article is that the conservatives' arguments misconstrue the Court's dilemma. The Court's two objectives are not, as
Justice Scalia argues, irreconcilable with each other. Rather, they are
irreconcilable with the death penalty. More precisely, these constitutional objectives are irreconcilable with any constitutionally legitimate
justification for the death penalty. The conservatives have very effectively used one objective to argue against the other, but they have
never produced an equally effective rejoinder to the main point of the
1976 plurality: a system that is either arbitrary or that ignores the
unique circumstances of each defendant and crime violates our most
basic notions of constitutional justice. 163 The conservatives' only response to this basic principle is melancholy resignation. "Perhaps
these sentiments do not sufficiently temper justice with mercy," Scalia
laments in Booth, before dismissing the whole matter as someone
else's problem.' These lamentations are unnecessary; the solution is
(intellectually, if not politically) simple. Contrary to Justice Scalia's
assertions, the two objectives defined by the Court in 1976 can both
be achieved, but only by eliminating the source of the conflict: the
death penalty.
It is the Court's own fault that the death penalty dilemma has been
misunderstood. The Court has never undertaken any systematic review of the legitimate constitutional rationale justifying the death penalty. 6 The Court has skirted this issue by deferring broadly to the
conclusory assertions of the states about their statutory rationales.
Starting with Gregg and the other 1976 cases, the justices focused
their attention almost exclusively on the minutiae of capital sentencing
161. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
162. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3058 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
163. See Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
164. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. For a discussion of the Court's skimpy treatments of this issue, see infra notes 175-88
and accompanying text.
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while ignoring the larger issues of constitutional justification for the
death penalty. But this process of fine-tuning had no clear direction,
given that the Court always proceeded from the premise that the penalty itself is constitutional. The system inevitably collapsed into a morass of complications and contradictions, resulting in a post-Gregg
system that appears to produce results just as irrational and arbitrary
as the pre-Furmansystem.
Justice Scalia's attacks on the Court's process of constantly finetuning the capital punishment system provide the opportunity to reconsider the original premises of the death penalty. Justice Scalia's
opinions in the victim impact statement cases contain a critique of the
1976 plurality's view concerning the justifications for the death penalty and suggest Scalia's alternative, more jaundiced view.
In the remainder of this section I discuss these two alternatives, neither of which provides a satisfactory constitutional justification for
the penalty. Indeed, neither the Gregg plurality nor Justice Scalia accurately represents the states' true objectives as defined by their death
penalty statutes. If the various death penalty statutes now in effect are
any indication, the states themselves have only muddled and perhaps
even irrational notions about the purposes of the death penalty. This
situation is unacceptable under even the most lenient reading of the
Constitution. Surely even Justice Scalia would concede that a penalty
must serve some purpose to survive constitutional scrutiny.
A.

The Court's Confused Attempts To Justify the Death Penalty

Theories of punishment are commonly divided into two broad
types: utilitarian and retributive. Utilitarians are consequentialists. To
a utilitarian, punishment is justified only if it produces a greater quantum of social good than the absence of punishment.'6 Likewise, utilitarians assert that a punishment should never be more severe than

166. The philosophically attuned reader will be aware of the deep splits among utilitarians
about almost every aspect of utilitarian theory. There are act-utilitarians, who would apply utili-

tarian principles to each particular incident of punishment; and there are rule-utilitarians, who
would apply utilitarian principles through rules of general applicability, without regard to
whether a particular instance of punishment would increase the overall measure of utility. Likewise, even among groups of act- or rule-utilitarians there are disagreements about initial definitions of terms such as "good" or "utility," as well as the means by which social goods are
measured. H.L.A. HART, Utilitarianismand Natural Rights, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 181, 187-94 (1983); J.O. Urmson, The Interpretationof the Moral Philosophy of
JiS. Mill, in TtEoRIEs OF ETmcs 128-36 (Philippa Foot ed., 1967). For the most part, these
philosophical disagreements among utilitarians are irrelevant to the following discussion, because I believe that both the Gregg plurality's and Justice Scalia's systems of capital punishment

are inconsistent with any variation of utilitarianism. To the extent that the differences between
utilitarians are relevant, they will be discussed below.
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necessary to produce the intended result of deterring criminal behavior. 67 The rationale for applying the least severe punishment necessary
to prevent the designated criminal conduct is that society should try to
achieve its purpose of preventing crime at the lowest cost possible. 68
More severe punishments are costlier for society to inflict than less
severe punishments; therefore society should always select the least severe effective alternative as a means of maximizing its return on the
punishment. Finally, utilitarians view punishment with an orientation
toward the future, i.e., toward the likely ramifications in the future of
a punishment inflicted in the present. 69
Retributivists, on the other hand, contend that punishment is justified on purely moral terms. That is, punishment is society's necessary
moral response to the moral violation a criminal act represents.7 0 In
the retributive scheme, punishment is not simply a temporal matter of
pragmatic usefulness; it is an imperative derived from the very nature
of law.' 71 In Kant's famous example, even on the last day of a society's existence a murderer must be executed "so that everyone will duly
receive what his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof
will not be fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying
out the punishment.' 7 Retributivists are not concerned with the

167. Bentham provides the classic statement of this proposition: "The punishment ought in
no case to be more than what is necessary to bring it into conformity with the rules here given."
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 169 (J.H.

Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970).
168. Again, the classic statement of this proposition is Bentham's. According to Bentham,
one of the four objects of punishment is "whatever the mischief be, which it is proposed to
prevent, to prevent it at as cheap a rate as possible." Id. at 165.
169. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in THtoIEs or E1 ucs, supra note 166, at 146.
170. In the words of Lord Justice Denning, Master of the Rolls of the Court of Appeal in
England, "In order that an act should be punishable, it must be morally blameworthy. It must
be a sin." SIR ALFRED DENNING, TiE CHANGno LAW 112 (1953).
171. As with the utilitarians, there is substantial disagreement among retributivists about the
nature of the theory. Indeed, the term has been used to describe some very different approaches
to punishment. See John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 Pint. Q. 238 (1979). There is
even disagreement about the source of the obligation to inflict jus talionis for a criminal violation. Religious theorists will argue on behalf of God as the source of the obligation to punish,
while secularists will find the obligation in some categorical (or at least hypothetical) moral imperative or even social contract theory. Theorists sometimes even disagree with themselves over
sourcing. Compare JEFrRiE G. MURPHY, RETRmUTIoN, JUsTICE, AND THERAPY 100 (1979) (offer-

ing a "quasi-contractual" theory of obligation, derived from Kantian punishment theory) with
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment? 87 COLuM. L. REV. 509 (1987)
(casting doubt on his earlier conclusions and also on the issue of whether Kant even had a theory
of punishment). As with the internecine battles among utilitarians, the theoretical disagreements
among retributivists are irrelevant to the present discussion, except where specifically mentioned
below.
172.

1965).

IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELE

NTS Os JUSTICE 102 (John Ladd trans.,

106

FLORIDA STA TE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:67

practical consequences of punishment. Rather, they are concerned
with ensuring that every criminal violator receives his or her just desert (jus talionis) for violation of a universal law. Likewise, the criminal can assert no argument against the punishment, for simply by
entering into society the criminal subjects himself or herself to the operation of this law.' 73 Finally, in contrast to the utilitarians, who emphasize the future consequences of present punishment, retributivists
are oriented toward the past. Retributivists focus exclusively on the
nature of past violations that justify present punishment, and disregard any future effect the punishment might have on the criminal or
74
on society as a whole.'
The United States Supreme Court has attempted to apply these theories of punishment to the modern system of capital punishment only
once, in Gregg. Unfortunately, the Gregg discussion is not very enlightening. The entire discussion of these complicated theoretical issues in Justice Stewart's Gregg plurality opinion takes only five pages
in the official reporter. 75 Yet in this short space Justice Stewart's discussion in effect provides a constitutional endorsement for both the
utilitarian and retributive justifications of capital punishment.
Justice Stewart discusses the retribution theory in only one paragraph and two footnotes. 7 6 In this skimpy discussion Justice Stewart
endorses the version of retributive theory that emphasizes the denunciatory function of punishment. 77 "[C]apital punishment is an expres-

173.
No one suffers punishment because he has willed the punishment, but because he has
willed a punishable action. If what happens to someone is also willed by him, it cannot be a punishment.... To say, "I will to be punished if I murder someone," can
mean nothing more than, "I submit myself along with everyone else to those laws
which, if there are any criminals among the people, will naturally include penal laws."
Id. at 105.
174. Rawls, supra note 169, at 145-47.
175. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87 (1976) (plurality opinion).
176. Id. at 183.
177. Id. Itisnot clear why Justice Stewart does not mention the more mainstream versions
of retributive theory. One reason may be the insurmountable obstacles presented by the task of
formulating a version of retributive theory that is both secular (to satisfy the requirements of the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause) and easily applicable by courts and legislatures. The
applicability problem is raised by the need to ascertain the precise nature and degree of the
defendant's moral guilt in every case. This is necessary to apply the proper amount of retribution
to rectify the defendant's moral violation. In other words, a retributive system must have some
mechanism for determining how much punishment the defendant "deserves" in light of all the
circumstances of his or her case or, indeed, all the circumstances of his or her entire life. See
Gertrude Ezorsky, The Ethics of Punishment, in PHILOSOPICAL PERSPECTIMv

ON PUNISHMENT

xi, xxvi (Gertrude Ezorsky, ed., 1972). Ithas been difficult for supporters of retributive theories
to come up with plausible mechanisms for judging moral guilt even in the cloistered world of
academic philosophy. In the real world of judges, lawyers, juries, and criminal trials the task (if
done in an intellectually honest manner) is probably impossible.
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sion of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct,"
Justice Stewart wrote. 7 The death penalty, he wrote, is "an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so
grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may
be the penalty of death.

1 79

Justice Stewart does not note or respond to the many flaws that
have been identified in the denunciatory version of retributive theory. 180 Nor does Justice Stewart recognize that adopting the denunciatory version of retributive theory in Gregg is inconsistent with the
plurality's vote the same day to strike down the mandatory death sentencing statutes in Woodson and Roberts.'' He notes simply that although "'[rletribution is no longer the dominant objective of the

178. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
179. Id. at 184.
180. The most significant problem with the denunciatory version of retribution is that it
relies on a dubious logical presupposition. Specifically, it is not necessary to punish someone,
much less execute someone, to denounce the culprit's bad behavior. Society has many other ways
to get the message across that murder is wrong. As H.L.A. Hart pointed out, advocates of the
denunciatory version of retributive theory make the logical mistake of confusing a justification
of punishment with a defining feature of punishment. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RE-

SPONStILITY 263 (1968). In other words, although denunciation is a defining feature of punishment, it does not justify punishment because other forms of social expression may communicate
denunciation (and therefore serve the social purposes of denunciation) as well or better than
punishment. In Hart's words, "[wle do not live in society in order to condemn, though we may
condemn in order to live." Id. at 172. Another flaw of the denunciation justification noted by
Hart is that the theory permits judges to punish without considering the consequences of their
actions. The denunciation justification "tempt[s] [judges] from the task of acquiring knowledge
of and thinking about the effects of what they are doing." Id. at 171. Also, the denunciation
justification presumes a moral consensus that does not exist. The theory relies on the judge or
jury as the communicant of this mythical social consensus. This is too heavy a burden in a
morally plural society, in which the judge's (or jury's) "judgment of the reasonable man very
often is a mere projected shadow, cast by the judge's own moral views or those of his own social
class." Id.
Finally, all denunciatory theory is conceptually confused because theory cannot identify the
proper target of the denunciatory message. If the criminal being punished is the intended recipient of the denunciatory message, the message will quite likely be overridden by the criminal's
concern with his or her own suffering. This is especially true where the criminal is faced with a
death sentence. Long prison sentences and death sentences "are painful independently of any
expressive meaning which they may have: so is this not liable to distract the offender from their
expressive meaning, rather than reinforcing it?"

R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 242

(1986). However, if members of society other than the offender being punished are the intended
recipients of the denunciatory message, then the theory seems to abandon retribution in favor of
utilitarian purposes such as education, prevention, or deterrence. The author of one of the better
theoretical discussions of the expressive nature of punishment takes the latter point to heart, by
treating the attendant social benefits of denunciation, rather than the denunciation itself, as the
primary goal of "expressive" punishments. See JosL FEINBRG, The Expressive Function of
Punishment, in DOINo & DESERVINo: ESSAYS IN ThE THEORY OF REsPoNsILrrY 95-118 (1970).

181.

See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
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criminal law,' . . . neither is it a forbidden objective nor one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men."'' 8
Justice Stewart's discussion of utilitarian theories of justification is
a bit longer, but no more enlightening, than his discussion of retribution. The utilitarian case for capital punishment rises or falls on the
question of deterrence.' The social utility that utilitarians must prove
in order to justify the death penalty is a level of general deterrence
that outweighs the cost to society of inflicting the punishment plus the
value of the obvious suffering resulting from the intentional taking of
a human life by the state. Also, to justify the death penalty, utilitarians must prove that the penalty provides a higher quantum of social
utility than society could achieve through the use of other, less extreme (and less expensive)'" penalties. In short, deterrence is the key
to a utilitarian death penalty.
Despite much effort, however, no one has been able to establish
conclusively that the death penalty deters the commission of capital
crimes any better than long prison sentences.' 85 The state of the re-

182. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)).
183. 1 am speaking here of general deterrence, or the theory that the execution of a particular capital murderer will deter other persons from committing similar crimes. Incapacitation and
specific (or individual) deterrence are two other utilitarian values that come into play in noncapital contexts. Incapacitation is the theory that the defendant must be kept out of society so that
he or she can do no more harm. Incapacitation cannot justify a death sentence because imprisonment, which is a less intrusive and less expensive alternative to execution, would satisfy the
utilitarian need to isolate the violent offender from society. Specific deterrence is the theory that
punishment is justified on the ground that the person punished will be deterred from committing
similar acts in the future. Specific deterrence cannot justify a death sentence because the less
intrusive means of life imprisonment without parole would serve the same utilitarian purpose.
184. See Andrew H. Malcolm, Society's Conflict on Death Penalty Stalls Procession of the
Condemned, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1989, at B10. Malcolm cites the work of Robert Spangenberg, a death penalty opponent who studied capital punishment costs for the American Bar Association and found that the cost of a "prolonged legal battle" over a death sentence may be
three times what it costs to imprison a 30-year-old for life. Id. See also Lori Rozsa, Lack of
Money Halts Opening of Prison for the Condemned, MAMI HEa.LiD, Apr. 13, 1992, at IA, 5A
("It costs an average of $3.2 million to execute an inmate ....
five times the cost of keeping a
person in prison for life.").
185. Much of the modern work on this subject focuses on social scientist Isaac Erlich's claim
that he has established a link between the death penalty and the deterrence of capital crimes. See
Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65
AM. EcON. REV. 397 (1975) (hereinafter Ehrlich, Deterrent Effect); Isaac Ehrlich, Deterrence:
Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209 (1975); Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. EcoN. 741 (1977); Isaac

Ehrlich, Of Positive Methodology, Ethics, and Polemics in Deterrence Research, 22 BRrr. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 123 (1982). There has been a flood of critical response to Ehrlich's work, citing
numerous flaws and inadequacies in his methods and conclusions. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BOWERS,
LEGAL HOMCIDE: DEATH ASPUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982, at 303-35 (1984); Lawrence R.

Klein et al., The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Assessment of the Estimates, in
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search today is not significantly different than it was in 1976, when
Justice Stewart was forced to conclude that "there is no convincing
empirical evidence either supporting or refuting [deterrence
claims]."' 6 Yet, having made this concession regarding the evidence,
Justice Stewart then endorsed the states' reliance on deterrence (and
thus on utilitarian arguments) to justify their capital punishment statutes. In the absence of evidence, Stewart says, "[w]e may nevertheless assume safely" that some murderers will not be deterred, while
other potential killers may be deterred.1 7 After gliding past the logical
difficulties inherent in "assuming safely" something that may not, in
fact, be true, Stewart concludes that "the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe." 8 8"
B.

Look To What We Do, Not To What We Say

The discussion of punishment theories in the Gregg plurality opinion occurs at the end of Section III, which addresses the constitution-

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF

CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 336-60 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978); Brian Forst,
The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis of the 1960s, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 743 (1977); Hans Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faiths, 1976
Sup. Cr. REV. 317; Deryck Beyleveld, Ehrlich's Analysis of Deterrence, 22 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 101 (1982); James A. Fox & Michael L. Radelet, Persistent Flaws in Econometric Studies of
the Deterrent Effect on the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 29 (1989).
The authors of one recent review of this debate note that even Ehrlich himself explicitly states
that his conclusions "do not imply that empirical investigation has proved the preventive effect
of capital punishment." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRIN6 & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE AMERICAN AGENDA 182 (1986) (quoting Ehrlich, Deterrent Effect, supra, at 416). The authors of this study note further that:
neither Ehrlich nor anyone else has provided any evidence that capital punishment is a
more effective deterrent to homicide that [sic]
long prison terms. It is not that the
evidence is inconclusive; it does not exist. We have no empirical data to tell us what
the differential deterrent effects of disparate periods of incarceration are vis-a-vis the
death penalty.
Id. This situation is unlikely to change, for reasons summarized by Charles Black:
The inescapable flaw [of studies attempting to prove deterrence] is, of course, that
social conditions in any state are not constant through time, and that social conditions
are not the same in any two states. If an effect were observed (and the observed effects, one way or another, are not large) then one could not at all tell whether any of
this effect is attributable to the presence or absence of capital punishment. A "scientific"-that is to say, a soundly based-conclusion is simply impossible, and no methodological path out of this tangle suggests itself.
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 33-

34 (2d ed. 1981).
186. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185 (1976) (plurality opinion).
187. Id. at 185-86.
188. Id. at 187.
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ality per se of the death penalty. 8 9 After the favorable discussion of
the utilitarian/deterrence and retribution theories, Justice Stewart
concludes that the Constitution does not prohibit punishment based
on these theories-even where the evidence supporting the theories is
virtually nonexistent or contradictory.190 This seems to settle the matter: the death penalty is constitutional. But Justice Stewart then demarcates a new section of the opinion, in which he addresses at length
the details of the constitutional requirements imposed on states that
apply the death penalty.19' Because of the way Justice Stewart segregates the theoretical discussion from the discussion of the mechanics
of the new constitutional system of capital punishment, it is unclear
whether Stewart intends to draw any linkage between the theories of
punishment and the new rules regarding the application of the death
penalty.
However, the structure of the Gregg plurality's argument dictates
that the two discussions must be linked. The only reason provided for
the "guided discretion" requirements imposed by the Gregg plurality
is that these requirements cure the arbitrariness problem identified in
Furman.9 2 As several justices pointed out in Furman, the problem
with the old, pre-Furmanstatutes is that they failed to apply the death
penalty in a manner that would serve a constitutionally legitimate interest, i.e., retribution or deterrence. 93 The guided discretion system
established in Gregg is the Court's answer to this problem. This system provides a mechanism through which the Court can ensure that
an individual is sentenced to death only if the sentence will serve at
least one of the two legitimate state interests of deterrence and retribution. The requirements imposed in Section IV of the Gregg plurality
opinion would have no basis in law without reference to the two justifications for the death penalty that Stewart discusses in the opinion's
previous section. Therefore, the unequivocal endorsement of the
death penalty's constitutionality at the end of Section III of the Gregg
opinion is qualified by the requirements enumerated in Section IV.
Gregg does not hold that retribution and utilitarianism/deterrence justify the death penalty; Gregg only holds that the "guided discretion"
system's peculiar formulation of retribution and deterrence justifies
the death penalty.'9
189. Id. at 183-87.
190. Id. at 185-86.
191. Id. at 190.
192. Id. at 206-07.
193. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300-05 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);
id. at 308-09 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
194. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
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The problem with the Gregg solution is that the system defined by
guided discretion coupled with individualized sentencing does not address the problems identified in Furman. I am not speaking now of
the fact that the post-Gregg system is just as arbitrary as the pre-Furman system, although I believe that is the case. I am speaking of the
Gregg system's failure to provide a satisfactory answer to the broader
theoretical conclusion of Furman: the pre-Furmansystem was too arbitrary to serve either of the two legitimate purposes justifying capital
punishment-retribution or deterrence. Although the plurality in the
1976 death penalty decisions claims it is responding to this theoretical
failing of the pre-Furman system, in fact the criteria for death sentencing set forth in Gregg and the other 1976 cases do not bear a systematic relationship to the theoretical purposes of retribution and
deterrence that the Gregg criteria are supposed to serve. The significance of this failure cannot be understated. If I am correct, the current capital punishment system is subject to attack not only on the
empirical ground that it fails to produce predictable results, but also
on the theoretical ground that the system is irrational because it is not
based on any legitimate state interest.
1.

Retribution, Deterrence, and the IndividualizedSentencing

Requirement
The Court's requirement of individualized sentencing illustrates the
disjunction between what the Court said about theoretical justifications for the death penalty and what the Court did in terms of establishing limits and constraints on death sentencing. The reader will
recall that the requirement of individualized sentencing is the primary
point of the Woodson decision, and later served as the theoretical basis for the Lockett and Eddings requirement that a sentencer must be
given unlimited discretion to mitigate a death sentence.1 9 The reader
also will recall that Justice Scalia attacked the individualized sentencing requirement in his Walton concurrence on the ground that the requirement is inconsistent with the guided discretion system mandated
in Gregg.' 96 Putting Scalia's views on these theoretical issues aside for
the moment, 97 the basic problem with the Court's individualized sentencing requirement is that the requirement is inconsistent with both
utilitarian and retributive justifications for the death penalty.

195. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
196. See supra notes 103-26 and accompanying text.

197. His views on the subject will be discussed at length in the next section. See infra notes
223-48 and accompanying text.
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For example, individualized sentencing would have no place in a
purely utilitarian system that concentrated exclusively on the deterrence value of each death sentence. Under such a system, society
would be interested less in the fairness of any single defendant's death
sentence than in the effect a swift and certain death sentencing system
would have on other individuals who might contemplate committing
similar crimes. As Justice White points out in his dissent to the
Court's most recent mandatory death sentencing ruling, a mandatory
death sentence is the most effective way of achieving the widest possible deterrent effect. 98
The defendant in such a system would be little more than an instrument the state uses to reach its targeted audience of potential murderers. Individualized sentencing is unnecessary in a purely utilitarian
system because a society employing this system would not care
whether a particular defendant "deserves" his or her punishment, so
long as the deterrent message is adequately communicated by the execution and the overall number of killings in society is reduced accordingly. Indeed, if a society employing a utilitarian capital punishment
system could assure itself that the number of potential victims saved
by the deterrent effect of the penalty is larger than the number of
innocent persons wrongly executed for murders they did not commit,
the society justifiably could decide that procedural protections should
be virtually eliminated, on the ground that a few wrongful executions
are worth enduring for the overall good of a lower murder rate.'9
The contradictions between the post-1976 constitutional requirements and the utilitarian/deterrence justification of the death penalty
do not stop at Woodson. The utilitarian arguments favoring the death
penalty may also argue in favor of extending death sentences to crimes
other than murder, such as armed robbery, rape, kidnapping, or aircraft hijacking. Assuming that the problems of proof accompanying
all deterrence arguments could be surmounted, 2°° and it could be
shown that a few death sentences imposed for armed robbery would
result in a significant reduction in the overall number of armed robberies, the utilitarian would be obliged to support application of the
death penalty to armed robbery. However, despite the Supreme
Court's favorable treatment of the deterrence argument in Gregg, the

198. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 87-88 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
199. Opponents of utilitarianism often argue that utilitarianism may require innocents to
suffer when such suffering would provide greater social benefits than a more limited form of
punishment. See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RicHARDs, THE MORAL CRrriCiSM OF LAW 232-33 (1977).
200. For the problems of proof posed in the death penalty context, see supra note 185, For
the broader criminal context, see generally Daniel Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the
Empirical Evidence, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 185, at 95.
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Court has refused to accept the applicability of that argument to
crimes not involving a killing. The Court held in 1977 that the death
penalty could not be imposed as punishment for crimes other than
those involving the "unjustified taking of human life." '20' The Court's
opinion deals with the problems posed by its own utilitarian arguments from Gregg in a manner that would become common in the
post-Gregg era of death penalty jurisprudence: it ignored them.
The individualized sentencing requirement fares only slightly better
when considered in light of the Court's retributivist argument. Retributivist theorists generally argue that an assessment of the defendant's
character should play a role in assessing blame and inflicting punishment. However, the role of the defendant's overall character is usually
subordinated to other concerns, such as the moral culpability of the
defendant's specific criminal act, and the need to maintain society's
° The Court
moral equilibrium by punishing every criminal violation 202
does not mention, much less discuss, any such theory in striking down
the Louisiana and North Carolina mandatory death penalty statutes.2"" This is an unfortunate omission, because if one applies the
Court's discussion of the retributivist argument in Gregg to the mandatory death penalty cases, a good argument could be made that
Woodson and Roberts should have been decided in favor of the mandatory statutes. As noted above, the form of retributivism that the
Court found attractive in Gregg emphasized the denunciatory function of punishment.2 4 Yet when the Court in Woodson and Roberts
forced states to introduce qualifications and exceptions to death sentences in first-degree murder cases, it greatly diluted the denunciatory
effect of capital punishment. The message that all intentional murderers will be put to death is clear and strong enough to satisfy the retributive spirit. The message that intentional murderers will sometimes be
put to death is equivocal and weak; it expresses little except society's
ambivalence.
2. Retribution, Deterrence, and "Guided Discretion"
Like the individualized sentencing requirement, the system of
guided discretion the Court generated in Gregg lacks any systematic
theoretical justification. The hallmark of the guided discretion system

201. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
202. For a good discussion of the complicated interplay of these factors, see ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPMCAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981).
203. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
204. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
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is the bifurcated trial, with a penalty phase conducted under the guidance of aggravating factors set forth in a statute. This basic structure
is dictated by neither utilitarian nor retributivist principles. Nothing
suggests that a Gregg-type bifurcated system makes the death penalty
a greater deterrent than an alternative system. Indeed, the Gregg bifurcated system detracts from the utilitarian desideratum of deterrence because it introduces many variables that reduce certainty and
therefore lessen the deterrent value of the punishment. Likewise, no
one suggests that the typical statutory aggravating circumstances are
good indications of the types of crimes that are deterred more readily
by the application of the death penalty. On the contrary, it could be
argued that the typical aggravating factor indicates just the opposite:
these factors seem to describe crimes and criminals that are beyond
deterrence.2 05

The application of retribution to the Gregg system is a more complicated issue. In theory, retribution could support the requirement of
a bifurcated trial, with the penalty phase oriented toward ascertaining
the precise degree of the defendant's moral guilt. But since every aspect of defendant's behavior could enter into this moral calculus, including aspects not covered by aggravating factors listed in the typical
Gregg-type statutes, it is more doubtful that retributive principles justify the limitation on sentencing discretion mandated by Gregg. "The
fact is that the considerations that determine the culpability of any
crime are infinite in number and variety, depending on the criminal as
well as the crime, and cannot possibly be catalogued objectively without gross error in the application of the definition of particular
crimes." 2 06

But regardless of whether retributive principles could justify the use
of a Gregg-type guided discretion system in the abstract, the more immediate problem is that the actual factors that crop up in the Greggtype death penalty statutes do not reflect retributive principles. Retribution simply does not seem to be the primary concern of states (or of
the American Law Institute, whose Model Penal Code provided the
original model for the Gregg-type statutes)2 7 that have adopted the
typical guided discretion death penalty statute. In this limited respect
Justice Scalia's observation in Booth is correct: moral guilt is not the
determining factor in imposing the death penalty under the modern
statutes. 2 8 However, as a few examples will indicate, Justice Scalia
misperceives the real rationale underlying the modern statutes.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See infra notes 209-19 and accompanying text.
E. GOWERS, A LIFE FOR A LIFE 38, quoted in HART, supranote 180, at 163.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Consider the Maryland statute at issue in Booth. 2°9 The statute has
ten aggravating circumstances, most of which are typical of other
states' death penalty statutes. The aggravating circumstances are:
(1) The victim was a law enforcement officer who was murdered
while in the performance of his duties.
(2) The defendant committed the murder when he was confined in a
correctional institution.
(3) The defendant committed the murder to escape or to attempt to
escape from custody, or to evade capture.
(4) The victim was taken or attempted to be taken during a kidnapping or abduction, or an attempt to kidnap or abduct.
(5) The victim was a child abducted in violation of the statute.
(6) The defendant committed the murder under an agreement or
contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration to commit
the murder.
(7) The defendant engaged or employed another person to commit
the murder and the murder was committed under an agreement or
contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration.
(8) The defendant was under a death sentence or life prison term
when the murder occurred.
(9) The defendant committed more than one first-degree murder
arising out of the same incident.
(10) The defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit a robbery, arson, rape, or sexual offense in the
210
first degree.
As with most other statutes of this sort, the jury may impose a
death sentence if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance.2 '
I contend that these aggravating circumstances are not motivated
by, and in some cases are not even consistent with, retributive principles of punishment. Applying the factors in the Maryland statute to
two hypothetical killers will clarify this point.
Killer number one murders the lover of his unfaithful wife in a killing that was carefully planned over a period of several weeks. Assume
that killer number one had cheated on his wife many times, that the
wife's lover did not know she was married, and that the victim was a
widower who was a loving father and the only living relative of his
three young children. Killer number two escapes from prison, kidnaps
a child, and is trying to rob a convenience store when he is seen by a

209.

Id. at 498 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(b) (1982).

210. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d) (1982 and Supp. 1986) (listing aggravating circumstances).
211. Id.
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police officer. He kills both the officer and child when he tries to flee.
Under the Maryland statute, killer number one should receive something other than a death sentence because he does not satisfy any statutory aggravating circumstance. It is highly likely that killer number
two will receive a death sentence. The state reasonably can claim that
his actions fall within statutory factors (1), (3), (4), (5), (9), and
(10).212 The likely sentences in the two cases seem clear, but what is the
explanation for those different outcomes? Intuitively, the explanation
does not seem to be a difference in the two killers' moral culpability.
After all, as a society we find it just as inexcusable-that is, just as
morally culpable-for the frustrated husband to kill the lover as we
do for the escaped convict to kill the police officer and the child. A
senseless killing is a senseless killing. Also, killer number one is an
unsavory and cold-blooded creature, whose action has effectively ruined the lives of the victim's three orphaned children.
Yet there is some logic to the Maryland scheme. Maryland does not
seek to execute killer number two because the state's residents find his
senseless killing any less morally excusable that killer number one's
senseless killing. The state seeks to execute killer two because its residents are simply afraid of him. The aggravating factors indicate that
killer number two is incorrigible. In the most basic sense the aggravating factors in the Maryland statute all relate to whether the state believes it can ever hope to control the murderer in the dock. Killer
number one fails to accumulate a single aggravated circumstance not
because his killing is any less morally reprehensible than killer number
two's or because he is a more moral person. Rather, killer number one
accumulates no aggravated circumstances because he has not shown
the kind of behavior that indicates he is beyond society's control.
Maryland's statute is nothing more than a rough predictor of future
behavior. The state has concluded that when a person kills a police
officer, or kidnaps and kills a child, or carries out a murder for hire,
that person has shown a capability of engaging in the sort of antisocial behavior that indicates the state can never hope to reach him
through ordinary legal strictures. Likewise, Maryland has concluded
that when a person kills while escaping from prison, he is so desperate
for his freedom that he will do anything to achieve it. Put him back in
jail, and he is likely to do (or to try to do) the same thing again. Likewise, Maryland makes the judgment that. when a murderer kills someone in prison while serving a life sentence, the murderer has
recognized that he has nothing to lose, and demonstrated his willing-

212.

See supra text accompanying note 210.
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ness to act without restraint. In the absence of mitigating circumstances such as provocation, Maryland instructs its juries that they
may put that murderer to death in order to prevent the inevitable next
killing. Conversely, in situations like killer number one's killing-forpassion, Maryland's statute indicates that the risk of similar killings in
the future is not great enough to warrant a death sentence. This difference in treatment has nothing to do with morality; it has to do with
fear of the incorrigible sociopath.
If my interpretation of the Maryland statute (and therefore all but
one of the other state death penalty statutes)' 3 is correct, then it seems
that Texas has the only forthright death penalty statute in the country.
Texas does not use a standard set of aggravating circumstances to
guide the jury at the penalty phase of a capital trial. Under the Texas
system, the jury at the penalty phase considers three questions:
whether the murder was committed "deliberately," whether the defendant's conduct was unreasonable in light of any provocation by the
victim, and "whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society." 2 4 If the jury answers all three questions "yes," the
25
defendant is sentenced to death.
It is not difficult to understand how a Texas jury that has just
found the defendant guilty of "intentionally" killing the victim at the
guilt phase of a capital trial can then answer the first two penalty
phase questions "yes." Therefore, the key question in the Texas system is whether the defendant will commit future acts of violence.
Thus, only the Texas statute states explicitly what all other states'
death penalty statutes only grope toward in their enumeration of specific aggravating factors: Is the defendant in a particular murder case
likely to kill again? (Or, to put it another way, is this defendant so
incorrigible that we should fear his continued presence in society?) If
the answer to this question is "yes," then the state may execute him.
If the answer to the third question is "no," the Texas statute implies
213. The "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" (HAC) factor is the only aggravating circumstance
that crops up frequently in other statutes but is not in the Maryland statute. See supra notes 12935 and accompanying text. This factor is commonly interpreted to permit the execution of a
defendant who tortures the victim before killing him or her. See generally Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 (1988); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254-56 (1976). The HAC

factor also seems motivated largely by fear of the incorrigible defendant rather than by moral
factors typically cited by retributivists. States seek to execute defendants who torture their victims before killing them because the states doubt that it is possible to alter permanently the

behavior of someone whose actions are so disengaged from the normal constraints on human
conduct.
214. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991)

215.

Id. art. 37.071(d).
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that an execution is not worth the bother because society can deal with
the defendant in other ways.
The most obvious problem with the Texas statute is that the statute
makes the decision to execute someone turn on a jury's judgment that
is, by definition, imperfect. No jury has the power to ascertain with

100 percent certainty the future actions of the defendant, yet Texas
requires the jury to do just that.2 16 This imperfection did not sway the
United States Supreme Court, which upheld the Texas system in one
of the Court's five 1976 death penalty decisions.2 17 The Court did not
attempt to apply the theories of punishment discussed in Gregg to the
Texas statute. If it had done so, it would have discovered that neither
the deterrence nor the retribution arguments support a future dangerousness requirement. With regard to deterrence, the Texas statute itself reflects the recognition that individuals who are likely to commit
acts of violence in the future cannot be deterred. Therefore, the state
feels the need to execute these individuals before they commit another
murder. On the other hand, retributive theories do not apply because
these theories do not take into consideration any future activity when
considering the justifiability of present punishment. 18 A retributivist
justifies punishment only as a response to the defendant's past immoral conduct. Whether the defendant is likely to do harm to unknown people in the future is irrelevant to a retributivist's
determination of the defendant's just deserts.21 9

216. The Texas system has produced a mini-industry of "experts" on future dangerousness,
the most prominent of whom is Dr. James Grigson. Grigson is also known in the Texas death
penalty trade as "Dr. Death" for his highly effective testimony that defendants he never met are
sociopaths who will certainly commit future acts of criminal violence if permitted to live. See
Shelley Clarke, Note, A Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas's Capital Sentencing Statute After Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 TEx. L. Ra,. 407, 447-48 & n.188 (1990). The American Psychological Association has argued that psychological testimony such as Grigson's should not be
permitted because it is inherently unreliable. See Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychiatric Association, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080) at 8-9. The former chief
mental health officer for the Texas Department of Corrections has testified that predictions of
future dangerousness are correct only 33 percent of the time. See Sattiewhite v. State, 786
S.W.2d 271, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, Il1 S. Ct. 226 (1990). Other studies have
reported even higher error rates in future dangerousness predictions. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousnessand Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. Rav. 97, 110-11 n.50 (1984) (collecting studies reporting error rates of up to 92%); Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failureof
Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RuToEas L. REV.
1084, 1098 (1976) (86% error rate). Despite the dubious scientific or predictive value of future
dangerousness evidence, the Supreme Court has ruled that such evidence is permitted and does
not render the Texas statute unconstitutionally arbitrary. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983).
217. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
218. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
219. The third possibility is that Texas is concerned with incapacitation, i.e., killing the in-
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I have offered two conclusions in this section. First, every state
death penalty statute in the country is premised on the notion that
certain defendants are likely to commit future acts of violence, are
incorrigible and uncontrollable, and therefore must be executed.
Texas explicitly makes future dangerousness the key factor, while
other states simply make the determination of future dangerousness
indirectly, through the use of aggravating factors such as those in the

Maryland statute considered above. 22 0 My second conclusion is that
making future dangerousness the key to the process of "guided discretion" in the application of the death penalty cannot be supported by
either the utilitarian/deterrence or retributive theories of punishment.
If these two conclusions are combined, they seem to indicate that the
system of guided discretion lacks any theoretical foundation. In other
words, the system is irrational. I suspect that on one level Justice

Scalia agrees with this conclusion. After all, he attacked both the individualized discretion system in Walton 221 and the guided discretion
system in Booth, Gathers, and Payne.222 Where Justice Scalia and I
differ is in our response to the conclusion that the Court's current
system makes no sense. I would use that conclusion to justify a reconsideration of Gregg's initial holding that the death penalty can, if applied properly, satisfy the Eighth Amendment. Justice Scalia, on the
other hand, offers yet another rationale to justify the continued impo-

corrigible defendant so he will not kill again. As noted above, supra note 183, incapacitation
arguments cannot support the death penalty, because there are alternative methods of removing
and isolating the capital murderer from society.
The Supreme Court's blithe response to the problematic future dangerousness element of the
Texas statute inadvertently raises the incapacitation argument. The Court noted that "[t]he task
that a Texas jury must perform in answering the statutory question in issue is ... basically no
different from the task performed countless times each day throughout the American system of
criminal justice." Jurek, 428 U.S. at 275-76. It is true that the ordinary criminal sentencing
process requires sentencers and (at a later stage in the process) parole boards to consider a convicted defendant's likely future conduct in determining whether to put or keep the defendant in
jail. However, these non-capital sentencing contexts are not analogous to death sentencing.
When a judge in a non-capital case considers whether a prisoner is likely to commit crimes, for
example, the judge is making that determination in order to choose between releasing the defendant into society and incapacitating the defendant by putting him or her in jail. There is no third
option in the non-capital context. In the death sentencing context, however, the choice is not
between death and freedom. The third option is permanent incapacitation in prison. Therefore,
determinations of future dangerousness as the basis for a death sentence cannot rely on an incapacitation rationale because that rationale can be served equally well by other means.
220. See supra notes 209-13 (discussion of Maryland statute).
221. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3058 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
222. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2613 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 823 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 519 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sition of the death penalty. It is on this note that we must return a
final time to Justice Scalia's death penalty.
V.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S DEATH PENALTY, PART II

As the previous section indicates, the present system of capital punishment cannot be justified by any of the most common punishment
theories. Justice Scalia has acknowledged this in his death penalty opinions in cases such as Walton and Booth. His practical response to the
existing theoretical vacuum is to permit the states much wider latitude
in imposing death sentences than they have in the present system. But
Justice Scalia cannot solve the problem posed by the incoherence of
the Court's present stance toward death sentencing simply by deferring more broadly to state decisions on capital punishment. Even
Scalia has not suggested that the Constitution never limits the imposition of capital punishment. A punishment imposed for no reason beyond whim or caprice is an irrational punishment, and presumably
even Scalia would hold that the Constitution forbids irrational punishment. Thus, by permitting the states to impose the death penalty at
all, Scalia must identify some legitimate penal rationale to justify the
penalty. If my arguments in the preceding sections are correct,22 and
the rationale is neither deterrence nor retribution, then what is it?
Scalia's short opinions in the victim impact statement cases hint at
his answer. The main thrust of his opinions in those cases is that "personal responsibility" as well as "moral guilt" should be relevant to
determining the proper sentence in a capital case. 224 The term "personal responsibility" means nothing more than the entire harm-both
direct and tangential-caused by the defendant's actions, regardless of
whether the defendant knew of or could foresee the harm. At first
glance, Scalia's opinions on victim impact statements seem to state
nothing more than a very basic form of the traditional retributive justification of the death penalty. Under this interpretation, Scalia is
merely asserting that a defendant's just deserts should be measured
both by the level of defendant's moral culpability (as defined by such
things as the defendant's mens rea) and the degree of harm caused by
the defendant's immoral deeds. Although this argument is not unusual among retributive theorists, 225 focusing on the nature of the vic-

223.
224.
225.
tionship
97.

See supra notes 99-222 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
For a more complete and systematic philosophical account of the complementary relaof moral culpability and harm in retributive theory, see NozicK, supra note 202, at 363-

19921

SCALIA 'S DEATH PENALTY

tim's harm can lead to odd226conclusions about the severity of
punishment that is "deserved."
I believe Scalia is asserting something different, and far more radi2 27
cal, than this rather mundane restatement of retributive theory.
There are several indications in his victim impact opinions that this is
the case. For example, instead of treating what he calls "personal responsibility" (i.e., the harm defendant has caused) as a component of
the moral guilt that justifies retributive punishment, Scalia treats
harm and guilt as distinct justifications that operate independently of
each other. In Booth, Scalia argues that:
the principle upon which the Court's opinion rests-that the
imposition of capital punishment is to be determined solely on the
basis of moral guilt-does not exist, neither in the text of the
Constitution, nor in the historic
practices of our society, nor even in
22
the opinions in this Court. 1

The paragraph following this quote again distinguishes between defendant's moral guilt and the victim's harm. In this paragraph Scalia further justifies consideration of the victim's harm in capital cases by

226. For example, Blackstone suggests that some victims may be so important (and therefore
the harm caused by their murder so egregious) that the retributive urge for correspondence between offense and punishment cannot be satisfied even by the death penalty. "[T]he execution of
a needy decrepit assassin is a poor satisfaction for the murder of a nobleman in the bloom of his
youth, and full enjoyment of his friends, his honours, and his fortune." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES * 13.

227. Other problems appear if I am wrong and Justice Scalia is indeed arguing from a purely
retributive position. For instance, Scalia's arguments in Walton are inconsistent with a purely
retributive stance. He argues in Walton that state legislatures should be permitted to limit jury
discretion to mitigate death sentences and should even be permitted to subject certain kinds of
murders to a mandatory death sentence. See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3066-68 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring). Near-total deference to potentially very broad statutory limitations on
sentencer consideration of mitigating factors contradicts the central retributive requirement that
punishments be precisely proportionate to the degree of defendant's moral responsibility for the
crime. This proportionality assessment can only be carried out on an individual basis at the
sentencing stage of a trial. Permitting legislators to prejudge individual culpability by imposing a
mandatory death sentence on anyone whose offense falls into a broad category of first-degree
murder would violate the central retributive axiom that punishment should be an individualized
sanction imposed for a particular criminal act. See KANT, supra note 172, at 100.
The same argument would seem to prohibit legislatures from limiting the sentencer's discretion
to consider any aggravating circumstance the sentencer found relevant in a particular case. Otherwise, an individual murderer who "deserves" a death sentence under a proper application of
retributive principles may unjustly escape proper punishment because the list of statutory aggravating circumstances was insufficiently comprehensive. This is contrary to Scalia's view expressed in Booth that the legislature should have the prerogative to permit or disallow
aggravating factors such as victim impact. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
228. Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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reference to the democratic authority to use individual criminal trials
to assert broader social interests:
Recent years have seen an outpouring of popular concern for what
has come to be known as "victims' rights."... Many citizens have

found one-sided and hence unjust the criminal trial in which a
parade of witnesses comes forth to testify to the pressures beyond
normal human experience that drove the defendant to commit his
crime, with no one to lay before the sentencing authority the full
reality of human suffering the defendant has produced-which (and
not moral guilt alone) is one of the reasons society deems his act
worthy of the prescribed penalty. 29
Scalia's Payne opinion reiterates this point. Scalia insists that the
victim impact statement issue is not simply a pragmatic matter of
equalizing opportunities of prosecutors and defense attorneys. 2 0 He
points out that he would vote to permit states to broaden consideration of victim impact evidence in aggravation of a death sentence even
if Lockett were overruled and the states were no longer required to
give sentencers unlimited mitigation discretion in capital trials. 23' The
issue, he says, is not parity between mitigating and aggravating factors. Rather, the issue involves the more fundamental constitutional
principle that "permits the People to decide

. . .

what is a crime and

what constitutes aggravation and mitigation of a crime.' '232 The holding of Booth is wrong, Scalia asserts, because it "conflicts with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has found voice in a nationwide
'victim's rights' movement." 23
There are two keys to Scalia's opinions in the victim impact statement cases: the distinction between the defendant's moral guilt and
the victim's harm, and the emphasis on the assertion of a generalized
"public sense of justice" through the criminal process. Both themes
are inconsistent with the retributivist tradition. As noted above, a retributivist would not distinguish between harm and guilt; rather, retributive theories regard the victim's harm as one component of the
moral guilt that justifies punishment. In contrast, the articulation of
the victim's harm in Scalia's scheme serves a function independent of
moral guilt in assessing the proper punishment.
229. Id. (emphasis in original). In reviewing Payne, the Tennessee Supreme Court took its
cue from Justice Scalia, asserting that the system based on Booth and Gathers is "an affront to

the civilized members of the human race..." State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990).
230. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
231.
232.

Id.
Id.

233.

Id.
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This independent function is linked to Scalia's second theme: the
assertion of collective social values through a criminal trial. In the
most basic sense, the assertion of collective values is a central feature
of every punishment theory, including the various versions of retributive theory. For example, although the moral imperatives that justify
punishment in retributive theory are premised on each individual's unassailable autonomy and freedom, even in retributive theory the society's collective political and legal processes are permitted to define and
apply the universal moral imperatives by punishing those who commit
crimes .234
Scalia's approach to capital punishment magnifies the collective element in punishment beyond anything found in retributive theory.
Scalia's theory is distinguished from retributive theory in that it emphasizes the assertion of collective values for their own sake, independent of the moral deserts of the defendant. One of the cardinal
axioms of retributive theory is that "[j]udicial punishment can never
be used merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal or for civil society.""23 Likewise, retributive theory asserts that the
criminal is the moral beneficiary of every justly imposed punishment,
in the sense that punishments restore the "proper balance between
benefit and obedience. '23 6 In contrast, in Scalia's system the sentencing process in a capital case reflects social attitudes that encompass far
more than the defendant's own crime. According to Scalia, the sentencer at a capital trial may use the unanticipated and unknown consequences of a particular defendant's actions as an aggravating factor in
the defendant's trial because the society has an abstract need to ameliorate its "public sense of injustice" at criminal harms generally.
Justice Stevens misses Scalia's point when he responds in Payne
that evidence of unanticipated consequences "sheds no light on the
defendant's guilt or moral culpability, and thus serves no purpose
234. Several recent retributivist theorists have resorted to social contract concepts to reconcile this individual moral autonomy with the social obligation to respect the law and submit to
punishment when the law is violated. See supra note 171; see also HOWARD WILLIAMS, KANT'S
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 97 (1983).
235. KANT, supra note 172, at 100.
236. MURPHY, supra note 171, at 100. Murphy also says:
The criminal himself has no complaint, because he has rationally consented to or
willed his own punishment. That is, those very rules which he has broken work, when
they are obeyed by others, to his own advantage as a citizen. He would have chosen
such rules for himself and others in the original position of choice. And, since he
derives and voluntarily accepts benefits from their operation, he owes his own obedience as a debt to his fellow-citizens for their sacrifices in maintaining them. If he
chooses not to sacrifice by exercising self-restraint and obedience, this is tantamount
to his choosing to sacrifice in another way-namely, by paying the prescribed penalty.
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other than to encourage jurors to decide in favor of death rather than
'
life on the basis of their emotions rather than their reason." 23
To
Scalia, the exercise of the jury's emotion is itself the justification for
introducing victim impact evidence, and ultimately for imposing the
death penalty.238
Stevens and Scalia are at odds because they are dealing with two
different criminal universes. In Stevens' universe, a criminal trial is
anchored in the individualized facts pertaining to the defendant's
moral guilt. In Scalia's universe, the individualized moral guilt of the
defendant is only one part of the equation. Society's outrage at crimes
analogous to the defendant's is the other, equally important part of
the equation. In Scalia's universe, the trial serves only incidentally to
mete out individual justice to a deserving defendant; its primary aim is
to express society's sense of moral outrage and reaffirm collective values about justice. The defendant's punishment is a means to satisfy a
social end, rather than an end in itself. 3 9 If the unanticipated harm
caused by a defendant is egregious enough, and that harm outrages
society to a sufficient degree, the social outrage itself will justify a
death sentence even though the defendant is no more morally guilty
than other murderers who do not receive death sentences. This explains Scalia's willingness to abandon requirements that a judge or
jury be required to consider any evidence the defendant wishes to introduce during the penalty phase to mitigate the defendant's moral
culpability for a capital crime. 40 In Scalia's universe, the sentencer
may consider the defendant's moral guilt irrelevant.
It may seem at this point that Scalia has doubled back on himself
and arrived at another form of utilitarian theory. And, in fact, Scalia's justification of the death penalty does resemble utilitarian theory
in some respects. Like utilitarians, Scalia emphasizes the broader social context and implications of death sentencing, rather than the de-

237. Payne v. Tennessee, I ll S. Ct. 2597, 2625 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. Samuel Pillsbury has argued recently that the application of moral outrage is a legitimate part of a sentencer's duty in a capital case. See Samuel Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655 (1989). Whether it is
possible, as Pillsbury contends, for such outrage to be channeled into a systematic and fair retributive punishment scheme is open to question. In any case, by moving away from the retributive punishment framework, Scalia's justification of the death penalty abandons the moral limits
on sentencer outrage envisioned by Pillsbury's scheme. See id. at 685-98.
239. This distinguishes Scalia's theory from denunciatory theories discussed earlier. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text. Denunciatory theories are premised on retributive notions that a punishment's "essential expressive aim must be that of communicating to the
criminal himself a proper condemnation of his crime." Duff, supra note 180, at 236.
240. See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3058-59 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
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fendant's individual circumstances. Like utilitarians, he considers a
punishment justified if it has a positive social effect that outweighs
any negative effects. More precisely, Scalia would permit an inequitable result in an individual case (i.e., he would permit similar moral
acts to be punished dissimilarly) if the inequitable results would produce significantly greater positive social consequences.
These similarities are only superficial. Scalia's death penalty theory
is not utilitarian. First, the social utility Scalia asserts in favor of the
death penalty-as an avenue for society's emotive reaction to violent
crime-is not the utilitarian's usual hard, measurable, empirical consequence, such as deterrence. Also, unlike utilitarians, 241 Scalia does
not impose a proportionality or cost/benefit measure as a requirement
for the imposition of a punishment such as the death penalty. Indeed,
Scalia's scheme does not impose upon states seeking to apply the
death penalty utilitarian requirements of any kind. Scalia's death penalty is justified by the very act of using society's political processes to
authorize the penalty and establish standards for its imposition. Scalia's basic principle is simply that "the People" are permitted to decide
"what is a crime and what constitutes aggravation and mitigation of a
crime. ' 24 2 In other words, if "the People" want to use the death penalty, then no further utilitarian proof, support, or justification is necessary.
Justice Scalia's arguments in favor of the death penalty raise a third
major justification for punishment that I have not yet discussed: revenge. Scalia argues in Booth that states should be permitted to impose the death penalty on the basis of "the full reality of human
suffering the defendant has produced." 243 Then, he argues in Walton
that states should be permitted to eliminate the sentencer's consideration of mitigating factors by adopting mandatory death penalty statutes. ' " Finally, he puts these two positions together in Payne, noting
that states should have the authority to impose the death penalty
based on the harm caused by the defendant even if they are also permitted to prohibit consideration of mitigating evidence. 245 A system
arranged in this way would permit sentencers in capital trials to ignore
the defendant's character altogether and react solely to the bare facts
of the crime and its ancillary consequences. The defendant is viewed
in one-dimensional fashion as nothing more than the agent of harm.

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See supra note 168.
Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2613 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3058 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).

126

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:67

Instead of meting out justice in retributive fashion, according to the
defendant's moral deserts, Scalia's system avenges a harm by killing
the agent of the harm. Society's anger is assuaged, even if in traditional retributive terms the punishment is disproportionate to the offense.
The philosophical literature contains very little discussion advocating the use of revenge as a justification for punishment. There are
many good reasons for this. Revenge draws on a darker part of the
human psyche, which most societies take care not to enshrine in law.
Revenge tends to deny the imposition of a rational limit or structure
to punishment. At the enforcement level, a punishment system premised on revenge tells the sentencer to depend on the viscera instead of
the intellect to assess the level of punishment necessary in each case:
one feels revenge, one does not think it. And as even the supporter of
one form of "emotional justice" has recognized, feelings of this sort
are very difficult to cordon or control. 24 Finally, the revenge justification seems to trade the morally upstanding desideratum of jus talionis
(just deserts) for the amoral and bloodthirsty lex talionis (an eye for
an eye). To put it a slightly different way, punishment becomes justified by power rather than morality.
The widespread aversion to revenge as a justification for punishment seems to damn Scalia's death penalty under any but the most
empty interpretations of the Eighth Amendment. I suspect Justice
Scalia and those who follow his lead would object to the classification
itself. I would expect the objection that what I call revenge is merely a
harsh, strict-liability version of retribution. It is true that the line between retribution and revenge is not self-evident. The clear-eyed
Holmes denied that the line even exists, declaring simply that retribution is "vengeance in disguise. '247 But Scalia himself implicitly distances his justification for capital punishment based on the harms
caused by the defendant (which I contend is premised on revenge)

246. See Pillsbury, supranote 238, at 690.
247. OLIVER W. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAw 45 (1881). 1 should add that Holmes saw nothing particularly deplorable about this. Although he believed that the sentiment of revenge should
not be encouraged by the law, he also recognized that law could not avoid serving frequently as
the enforcer of one of society's most violent and pervasive emotions.
The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the
actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong. If people
would gratify the passion of revenge outside of the law, if the law did not help them,
the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving itself, and thus avoid the greater evil of
private retribution.
Id. at 41-42. Holmes viewed this fact like he viewed most unsavory facts about society: as a

reflection of the unsavory nature of human beings.
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from the facially retributive "moral guilt" justification.2 Also, Scalia's death penalty seems to fit the model of revenge theory sketched
by retributivists, who are constantly having to deny some version of
Holmes's contention that revenge and retribution are indistinguishable.
The retributivist Robert Nozick has offered one of the most thorough and systematic attempts to distinguish revenge theories from retributive theories. 49 Nozick suggests five characteristics that
distinguish revenge from retribution. Each of Nozick's suggested
characteristics, set forth below, indicates that Scalia's death penalty is
essentially vengeful rather than retributive in nature.
(1) "Retribution is done for a wrong, while revenge may be done
for an injury or harm or slight and need not be for a wrong." 2 10 This
is another way of saying that revenge may be disproportionate to the
moral gravity of the crime. As Scalia argues in all the victim impact
statement cases, the harm caused by the defendant alone can justify25a
death sentence, without regard for the defendant's moral guilt. '
Also, to the extent that a state may limit or even eliminate introduction of mitigating factors in a capital trial's penalty phase, as Scalia
would permit, the defendant's moral guilt becomes impossible to assess and therefore irrelevant to the sentencing process .22
(2) "Retribution sets an internal limit to the amount of punishment,
according to the seriousness of the wrong, whereas revenge internally
need set no limits. "253 This is another reference to the proportionality
requirement of retribution, under which punishment is just only if it
matches the moral culpability of the offender. Again, by rejecting the
element of moral guilt as a limit on punishments, Scalia tilts toward
revenge rather than retribution.
(3) Revenge is personal and inflicted because of what the defendant
did to the punisher's own person, relative, or group. "On the other
hand, the dispenser of retributive punishment need not have any such
personal tie with the victim of the wrongful conduct.' '254 This is the
characteristic of revenge that Scalia's scheme reflects most strongly.

248.

See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.

249. See NozicK, supra note 202, at 366-70. See also C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 42-46 (1987) (citing NOZICK).
250. See NOZICK, supra note 202, at 366.

251.
252.
253.
254.

See cases cited supra note 222.
See supra note 227.
See NOZiCK, supra note 202, at 367.
Id.
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Both the theoretical underpinning and the practical consequences of
Scalia's victim impact statement opinions involve efforts to personalize the death penalty sentencing process and place the jury or judge in
the position of the murder victim's grieving friends and family members. Reducing the distance between the sentencer and the victim introduces the emotions of revenge as an element of the jury's
deliberative process. State approval of victim impact considerations
encourages the sentencer to subjugate objectivity (in the sense of an
effort to assess rationally the defendant's moral guilt) to the natural
sympathy most judges and juries will feel with the aggrieved victims.
Scalia's repeated references to the "victim's rights movement" reinforce the perception that he intends to personalize the death sentencing process." 5 To the extent that the victim has interests in excess of
those necessary to serve society's more general retributive or utilitarian interests in punishment, those interests can only be characterized
as premised on instincts of personal revenge. That a state agent may
be carrying out this vengeful act on behalf of the victim's family or
friends does not change the vengeful character of the act.
(4) "Revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in the
suffering of another," which is missing in retribution. 5 6 Scalia's capital punishment scheme specifically anticipates that the death sentencing process will permit society to express the "outpouring of popular
concern" for victims of capital crimes.2 As explained above, this
concern for the victim's personal pain is different in kind from the
retributive concern with maintaining an abstract correspondence be28 o
tween the defendant's moral guilt and his or her just deserts.

255.

See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2613 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Booth v.

Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Other members of the Payne major-

ity also advocate the personalization of the sentencing process. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, victim impact evidence "is designed to show . . . each victim's 'uniqueness as an
individual human being,' whatever the jury might think the loss to the community resulting from
his death might be." Payne, I I S. Ct. at 2607 (emphasis in original). Justice O'Connor emphatically repeats this theme. "'Murder is the ultimate act of depersonalization.' . . . It transforms a
living person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is special
and unique about the person. The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to give

some of that back." Id. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
256. See NozIcK, supranote 202, at 367.
257. Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258. 1 doubt whether any system permitting sentencers in death trials to base sentences on
emotional judgments can escape the intrusion of vengeful sentiments that lead the sentencer to
ignore central igsues of moral guilt. For an argument to the contrary, premised on retributive
principles, see Pillsbury, supra note 238. Pillsbury argues that the sentencer legitimately may
employ retributive emotions of moral outrage against the defendant's crime, so long as those

aggravating emotions are counterbalanced with mitigating emotions of empathy for the defen-
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(5) It is not necessary that revenge be general and the revenger need
not avenge again in similar circumstances. 59 This characteristic of revenge fits Scalia's system in the sense that the outcome of every death
penalty sentencing proceeding conducted under Scalia's laissez-faire
guidelines will turn on the sentencer's emotional response to the victim's pain. Because sentencers will vary in emotional sensitivity to victim pain, and because death penalty statutes could permit virtually
unlimited sentencer discretion in elch case, death sentences under the
Scalia scheme would lose even the bare pretense of generality that they
presently enjoy.
Nozick's description of revenge theories of punishment seems to fit
Scalia's system precisely. It remains to be asked whether this matters.
After all, what is wrong with exacting revenge on individuals who
have violated the most sacred precept of every civilized society by taking the life of a fellow human? Practically speaking, it simply returns
American law to the state described by Justice Harlan in McGautha v.
California: "To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty,
and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly
understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be

tasks which are beyond present human ability.''26° The only element
Scalia adds to this existential uncertainty is that he brings into the
open the aspect of revenge for innocent victims, an element that was
probably in the minds of pre-1972 judges and juries anyway.
So why does this matter? Why do we feel an intuitive aversion to
revenge as a motive for punishing a murderer? On a theoretical level
we oppose revenge because it combines the worst aspects of utilitari-

dant's personal circumstances and positive moral qualities. Id. at 685-98.
Aside from the conceptual overlap of retributive and vengeful emotions, a major problem
with this system is that it would produce indecipherable sentences. A sentencing system such as
Pillsbury's proposal would be based partly on emotion and partly on reasoned application of
specific facts and circumstances (similar to the present Gregg-type ordering of specific statutory
mitigating and aggravating factors). But such a system will produce sentences whose justifications are only partly articulated. (This is necessarily so: if a sentencer's rationale could be fully
and precisely articulated it would fall within the current explicit rule structure that Pillsbury
finds unsatisfactory.) The part of the sentence that cannot be articulated satisfactorily, i.e., the
emotional part, is problematic because no one (including perhaps the sentencer) knows whether
the sentencer is responding to a legitimate factor relating to the defendant's moral guilt, or
whether the sentencer is responding to some emotional factor within his or her own psyche. The
fact that the present system of rule-oriented death sentencing unquestionably produces variable
and inequitable results, see id. at 668-69, does not necessarily mean we should give up rational
death sentencing in favor of moral hunches and emotions. It may mean instead that we should
give up death sentencing altogether.
259. See NozicK, supra note 202, at 368.
260. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971).
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anism and retribution, the two mainstream justifications for punishment. The main criticism typically leveled at utilitarian theories is that
they permit a criminal defendant to be used as a means to an end,
without regard to factors that may mitigate the defendant's moral
guilt. Utility theories rely on the social impact of general deterrence to
justify punishing a defendant more severely than his or her moral guilt
dictates. Likewise, a revenge theory permits the criminal justice system to use the defendant as a means to assuage the pain and loss felt
by the family and friends of the victim, and simultaneously purge society's violent sense of outrage at the defendant's conduct.
One of the two main criticisms usually leveled at retributive theories
is that they permit punishment without regard to whether any social
good is served by the infliction of pain on the person punished. Likewise, revenge theory permits a grievous punishment-an executionwhen the only direct benefit derived from the punishment is a small
measure of emotional relief for the victim's family and friends. The
second criticism is that retributivists have no way of accurately measuring the level of moral guilt necessary to justify punishment. Revenge
theory is even worse: a sentencer operating under this theory doesn't
even try to assess the degree of moral guilt. The victim's harm is the
key, not the defendant's explanation or rationale for that harm. The
sentence under such a system is purely visceral. A logical explanation
usually is not given for such sentences because a logical explanation
usually is not possible.
On a more basic level, we shrink from revenge theories because we
sense that punishments premised on revenge return us to a more primal and meaner state of social development. "Revenge is a kind of
wild justice," Francis Bacon wrote, "which the more man's nature
runs to, the more ought law to weed it out. "261 Justice Scalia displays
no such concern. "Perhaps these sentiments do not sufficiently temper justice with mercy," he writes in Booth, "but that is a question to
be decided through the democratic processes of a free people, and not
by the decrees of this Court. ' 262 The problem with Scalia's "not my
problem" approach is that the "democratic processes of a free people" take their cue on legal matters from the attitude toward justice
expressed by the Supreme Court. Scalia refers to Portia's advice to
Shylock on the quality of mercy. 263 But Shylock has some advice of
his own: "Why revenge! The villainy you teach me I will execute, and
it shall go hard but I will better the instruction.'"264
261.

FRANCIS BACON, OF REVENGE 15, in SELECTED WRITNGs (1955).

262.
263.
264.

Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
d. act 3, sc. 1.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

One can say at least this about Justice Scalia's death penalty: it is
an efficient machine. In Justice Scalia's world, there are few impediments to swift implementation of death sentences. When combined
with the Court's recent constriction of the habeas corpus writ,215 Scalia's death penalty would remove the federal courts-and indeed the
United States Constitution-almost entirely from the capital sentencing process. The spirit of Scalia's attack on modern death penalty jurisprudence would require the Court to overrule virtually every
constitutional decision favoring death penalty defendants since 1972.
In essence, the states would no longer have to justify any aspect of
their death sentencing system. The "democratic processes of a free
people" 6 would be given free rein, come what may.
In a very short time, Justice Scalia's death penalty may become the
Court's death penalty. At the structural level, the Court has already
begun the process of giving back to the state legislatures control over
the mechanics of the capital sentencing process. Payne indicates that a
majority of the Court is content to grant state legislatures the right to
broaden the discretion of sentencers to impose a death sentence based
on their own inchoate views of the defendant's crime.267 The Walton
majority indicates that most members of the Court want to give states
the right to limit mitigating evidence. 268 Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice White dissented in the original mandatory death sentence
cases.2 69 If their votes are added to Scalia's, only two more votes are
needed to return to an era when all first degree murders may be subjected to mandatory death sentences. As the Court gets increasingly
conservative, these votes will not be hard to find.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Payne canvasses the
changes that have occurred over the years in criminal sentencing principles. In this discussion he makes passing reference to the eighteenth
century penal reformer Cesare Beccaria.270 If Rehnquist had read a bit
more of Beccaria's famous treatise on punishment, he would have
found a chapter on the punishment of death. That chapter contains

265. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (limiting scope of issues that may
be raised in successor habeas corpus petition); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (restricting

retroactive application of new constitutional interpretations in habeas corpus proceedings).
266. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
267.

See Payne v. Tennessee, 11lS. Ct. 2597 (1991).

268.

See Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).

269. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 337 (1976) (White, J.,dissenting); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 308 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 306
(White, J., dissenting).
270. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605.
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Beccaria's appeal to Europe's new "humane princes," ' 27' urging them
to abandon the death penalty as an "example of barbarity. '272 Even
in Beccaria's day the rational arguments that the death penalty was
measurably beneficial to society failed both empirical and logical analysis. Yet then as now, the death penalty remained overwhelmingly
popular. "Why is this sentiment of mankind indelible to the scandal
of reason?" Baccaria wondered. 73 This is Baccaria's despairing answer:
It is, that, in a secret corner of the mind, in which the original
impressions of nature are still preserved, men discover a sentiment
which tells them, that their lives are not lawfully in the power of any
one, but of that necessity only which with its iron sceptre rules the
universe. 4
Justice Scalia's death penalty would once again permit "the People" to return the iron scepter to its former place of prominence in
American criminal jurisprudence. Open acceptance of the "wild justice" of revenge would thus replace the Court's brief, timid, and unsuccessful efforts to make the death penalty systematic and fair. This
judicial about-face would obscure the simple truth that the Court's
history of death penalty jurisprudence amply demonstrates: it is futile
even to pretend that the system can work fairly or systematically. But
then, as Beccaria recognized, "the history of mankind is an immense
sea of errors, in which a few obscure truths may here and there be
found."2'75 Some distant Court will discover those truths anew. For
now, we're on our own.

271. CESARE BECCARIA-BONESANA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 108 (Edward D.
Ingraham trans. 1953).
272. Id. at 104.
273. Id. at 105.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 106.

